Michigan Law Review
Volume 98

Issue 7

2000

A Global Solution to Multinational Default
Jay Lawrence Westbrook
The University of Texas School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol98/iss7/5

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A GLOBAL SOLUTION TO
MULTINATIONAL DEFAULT
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

, ...•..................•..•••..•............•..... 2278

•.........•.......•.......

UNIVERSALISM

......................................•..•..............•............••••••

2282

A Universalist Convention
:........................................ 2282
1. The Theoretical Background
2283
Convergence
of
Laws
.
2288
2.
3. A Unified Law and Forum
.
2292
.
2298
4. The Continuing Role ofNational Policies .
Interim Solutions
2299
.........

........................................

.........................

..........................

......................

....................

..........

B.

III. AN APPRECIATION AND CRITIQUE OF OTHER VIEWS
A.

Professor Rasmussen .
1. Asset Control
.
2. Disclosure
. .
3. Security as a Solution
Professor LoPucki
1. Generally
.
2. Corporate Groups
3. Lesser Universalism
4. Transitional Rules .
Professor Guzman
.....

..........

.....

B.

.

.................

. ............ ........................

.

.................... .........................................

.....................................

...............

.........................

. ....................................
. .......................

...................... .

.................................

..............................................

...

C.

2303
2303
2304
. 2305
2306
2307
2307
. 2311
. 2315
2329
2326
2328

•...•...•.

....................................................

........... ....................................

IV.

......

.................................................................

......................

. ......

. ..............................
.... ....

......................................................

:

CONCLUSION ..........................................................

....•.•..•........•.

A new world is slouching toward New York and London, Beijing
and Bangkok, to be born.1 If our planet and our values survive the
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
B.A.1965, LL.B.1968, University of Texas. -Ed. During the twenty years I have been an
academic, I have appeared as a witness and as counsel in a number of multinational bank
ruptcy proceedings in the United States and abroad. I have been employed on behalf of
both debtors and creditors and both United States and foreign parties, so I do not believe my
experience has produced any systematic bias.

I received some very helpful comments from Kenneth Klee, Ronald Mann, and Bruce
Markell. I am especially grateful to my co-author Elizabeth Warren for her insights. As al
ways, the staff of the Tarleton Law Library, especially John Pratter, have been invaluable. I
have benefited from the excellent research assistance of Ryan Bull and Majid Yazdi, both
Texas 2000. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to my former dean, Mark Yudof, for
having opened the door of opportunity into the international insolvency field. Any missteps
are despite all this help.
1. Our prospects have become more mixed since Yeats wrote THE SECOND COMING
(1921).
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secondary effects of that emergence, we may look forward to a hu
manity more prosperous and more integrated than at any time in hu
man history. The force that drives us to that future is free-market
capitalism constrained in the vessel of democratic institutions. One
important element in its progress is the fashioning of an international
system for managing the financial crises that are one of the free mar
ket's inevitable consequences. In this symposium, we debate which is
the best such system we can devise.
The argument of this contribution to the symposium can be sum
marized as follows:
a) Universalism - administration of multinational insolvencies by
a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law - is necessarily the
correct long-term solution. Bankruptcy is one of those laws that can
not perform its function unless it is symmetrical to the market in which
it operates. Virtually all theorists share this view and it is reflected in
the nearly unanimous practice of nations, including the United States.
The only substantive objection is that universalism would too greatly
submerge national policies, but experience in the United States and
elsewhere demonstrates that a national, market-symmetrical law can
largely accommodate local policies. In the same way, an international
system could permit considerable play to varying national policies and
could enforce them more effectively against multinationals.
b) The primary objection to universalism is political. It is argued
that universalism is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future.
Although political predictions are difficult, it is evident that globaliza
tion is producing enormous pressures for legal convergence and those
pressures are most likely to prevail as to laws that require market
symmetry to be successful. Many of the obstacles to universalism are
also obstacles to coordination and harmonization in antitrust, securi
ties laws, and other business laws. Solutions in each area will feed so
lutions in the others if globalization continues.
c) Contractualism as an alternative to universalism is not workable
domestically or internationally unless it is based on a system of domi
nant security interests. The theoretical benefits of such a system re
main highly controversial and its prospects for international adoption
are bleak.
d) The most difficult problem is fashioning an interim solution
pending movement to true universalism. "Modified universalism," as
proposed in the American Law Institute Transnational Insolvency
Project, is the best answer because its pragmatic flexibility provides
the best fit with the problem presented by the current patchwork of
laws in the global market, and because it will foster the smoothest and
fastest transition to true universalism.
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BACKGROUND

The symposium has arisen on a wave of bankruptcy reform that is
sweeping around the world. The reform movement addresses both
domestic and international bankruptcy laws, and is powerfully sup
ported by initiatives from the International Monetary Fund2 and the
World Bank.3
Legislatures in Bonn,4 Buenos Aires,5 Canberra,6
Ottawa,7 and Tokyo8 have rewritten their bankruptcy laws in the last
decade, as have Russia and China (twice each) and most of Eastern
Europe.9 New bankruptcy laws have also appeared in Singapore,
Indonesia, and Thailand.10 The wave has not crested. In addition to
the promise of further reform in Tokyo, the British government has
introduced a bill substantially revising the Insolvency Act of 1986, 11 the
Mexican Congress has adopted a measure completely rewriting La Ley

2 See LEGAL DEPT., INT'L MONETARY ORDERLY FuND, & EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY
PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES: KEY ISSUES {1999) [hereinafter IMF Report].
3.
htm>.

See World

Bank Initiative, <http://wwwl.worldbank.org/legaUinsolvency_in/overview.

4. lnsolvenzordnung [Insolvency Law], art. 102, reprinted in GesetzesbeschluB des
Deutschen Bundestages, Drucksache 12/2443, April 21, 1994. The German law was adopted
in 1994, but did not become effective until 1999. See Klaus Kamiah, The New German Insol
vency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ. 417 (1996).
5. Juan M. Dobson, Argentina's Bankruptcy Law of 1995, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998)
Comparative and Transnational Ap
(Symposium on International Bankruptcy Law:
proaches).
6. Corporations Act, 1989, ch. 5, div. 9, sec. 581, (Aust!.),
Reform Act, 1992.

amended by

Corporate Law

7. AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (Tentative Draft April 15, 1997) (finally
approved and awaiting translation) [hereinafter Canadian Statement].

8. Minjisaiseiho [Debtor rehabilitation law], Law No. 225 of 1999 (Effective April 1,
2000). See Junichi Matsushita, UNCITRAL Model Law and the Comprehensive Reform of
Japanese Insolvency, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION 151 (2000).
9. China: Supplementary Notices on Issues Concerning the Trial Implementation in
Several Cities of State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reemployment of Staff and
Workers, March 2, 1997; People's Republic of China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, enacted
December 2, 1986, effective November 1, 1988. Russia: The Law of the Russian Federation,
"On Insolvency (Bankruptcy), #6 - FZ of 8th Jan., 1998, effective March 1, 1998, replacing
Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy, effective March 1, 1993. Eastern Europe: Richard D.
Coates and Arlene Elgart Mirsky, Restructuring and Bankruptcy in Central and Eastern
Europe; Pamela Bickford Sak and Henry N. Schiffman, Bankruptcy Law Reform In Eastern
Europe, 28 INT'L LAW. 927 (1994).
10. See OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE & PUBLIC TRUSTEE OFFICE OF SINGAPORE, A GUIDE TO
THE N EW BANKRUPTCY ACT 1995, issued by the Official Assignee & Public Trustee Office
of Singapore; Andrew Chan Chi Yin, The Singapore Bankruptcy Act 1995, 1 ASIAN COM. L.
REV. 40-45 (1996); Tanya Senn, The New Bankruptcy Law in Thailand, 3 ASIAN COM. L.
REV. 50 (1998); Stacey Steele, The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Mod
ern Corporate Bankruptcy Regime?, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 144 (1999).
11. Insolvency Bill [H.L.], available at <http://www.parliament.thestationer.uk>.
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de Quiebras Y Suspension de Pagos,12 and many other ministries are
well along with reform measures.13 These domestic reforms have in
cluded, in every instance, substantial examination of other countries'
laws and reform proposals, so they rest upon an emerging interna
tional oeuvre of reform.14
The domestic reform movements are matched by the burgeoning
interest in transnational bankruptcy (or insolvency),15 which we may
define as the management of the general financial default of a multina
tional enterprise. The wave of reform at the international level dem
onstrates that the international community has a willingness and an
ability to achieve reform in the field of multinational insolvency that is
of obvious relevance to the present discussion. While the current re
forms are only first steps, they go well beyond what most observers
would have predicted just five years ago. In addition to the IMF and
World Bank initiatives, the United Nations Commission on Interna
tional Trade Laws ("UNCITRAL") has promulgated a Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (the "Model Law").16 The Model Law does
not adopt substantive bankruptcy rules, but rather, provides a system
of cooperation among the courts having jurisdiction over aspects of
the assets and affairs of a multinational enterprise in financial dis
tress.17 In many civil law countries, its adoption will provide an essen-

12 See Ley de Concursos Mercantiles y de reforma al articulo 88 de la Ley Organica del
Poder Judicial la Federaci6n, DIARIO OFICIAL, May 12, 2000, at 10.
13. New Zealand is one of many examples. See, e.g., New Zealand Ministry of Eco
nomic Development, Business Law: Major Projects, available at <http://www.med.govt.nz/
buslt/bus_pollbus_law/bus_Iaw_projects.html> (discussing New Zealand government's re
view of possible insolvency policy developments).
14. For example, the British government has sent questionnaires to experts around the
world. See THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, A REVIEW OF
COMPANY REsCUE AND BUSINESS RECONSTRUCTION MECHANISMS (1999) (United King
dom, seeking co=ents on proposed insolvency legislation) [hereinafter British Review].
See generally IMF Report, supra note 2.
15. "Bankruptcy" or "insolvency" law governs collective proceedings for the adjustment or
collection of debts on behalf of all creditors and other interested parties. It excludes actions
by a creditor or particular group of creditors to collect specific debts only, as with proceed
ings to seize and sell particular assets or to garnish debts . . . . In worldwide English
language usage, "insolvency" is perhaps the more common term for such proceedings where
a business debtor is involved, but in North America "bankruptcy" is at least as often used for
business proceedings as well as those involving consumers.
AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT at 1 n.2 (Tentative Draft, Apr. 14, 2000) (final approval, May 16, 2000;
forthcoming) [hereinafter ALI Statement]. In this article, the terms are used interchangea

bly.
16. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO E NACTMENT, U.N. SALES No. E.99.V.3 [hereinafter MODEL

LAW]; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/442 (1997) [hereinafter Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law], reprinted in 6 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 439 (1998).
17. Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 16, at 1.3.
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tial legislative direction permitting courts to cooperate with courts in
other countries to manage multinational bankruptcies.
In most
adopting countries, it is likely to make cooperation in reorganization
cases much easier, while frustrating efforts to engage in manipulation
of assets and other fraudulent activity.18 The Model Law has been
fashioned into a new Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, and has been contained in every version of the pending bank
ruptcy legislation in both houses.19 The basic principles of the Model
Law are included in the new Japanese law2° and its substance is part of
the bankruptcy legislation adopted in Mexico.21 The government bill
in Britain provides for its adoption there.22 It is under active consid
eration in a number of other countries, including New Zealand.23
On a regional level, the countries of the European Union have ne
gotiated a treaty providing for even closer coordination of transna
tional bankruptcies than the Model Law.24 For a variety of reasons, it
is now being adopted as a "regulation" and will be effective for all
members except Denmark in May, 2002.25 In North America, the ini
tiative has come from the private sector in the form of the Transna
tional Insolvency Project of the American Law Institute.26 Phase I of
that Project produced international statements of the bankruptcy laws
of the three NAFTA members.27 Phase II of the project culminated in
May, 2000, with approval of a statement of principles and legislative

18. Professor LoPucki and I disagree about the desirability of the Model Law. Compare
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trojan Horse in UNCITRAL, 33 Bankr. Ct. Dec. {CRR) No. 25 at
AS (Mar. 30, 1999) with Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fearful Future Far Off, 33 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) No. 25 at AS {Mar. 30, 1999).
19. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Congress (1999) (passed by
the House, 5/5/1999; passed by the Senate, in lieu of S. 625, 212/2000).
20. See Hideyuki Sakai & C. Christian Jacobson, The Japanese Bankruptcy Process En
ters a New Era: Enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Law, 11 NEWSLETTER OF COMM. J. 3
{2000).
21. See supra note 12.
22. See supra note 11.
23. See Mike Ross, Insolvency Law Will Help Investors, 2/18/99 NAT'L Bus. REV., Feb.
18, 1999, available in 1999WL 12335944.
24. See European Union: Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 1223 {1996) [hereinafter EU Convention].
25. See European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF
COMMUNITIES 160 (June 30, 2000) <http://Europa.eu.int/eur-lexl> [hereinafter
EU Regulation].

EUROPEAN

26. I am the United States Reporter for that project.
27. These statements have been approved by the Institute and are awaiting completion
of translation. See Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of United
States Bankruptcy Law {Tentative Draft April 15, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Statement];
Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law
{Tentative Draft Apr. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Canadian Statement]; Transnational Insolvency
Project, International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy Law (Council Draft No.1 Dec. 1,
1997) [hereinafter Mexican Statement].
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recommendations for closer cooperation in transnational bankruptcies
among the NAFfA members.28
Thus, the world is developing considerable experience and mo
mentum in the field that we discuss in this symposium, and is begin
ning to demonstrate a capacity and willingness to find international
solutions to the problems of general default. These movements have
received relatively little attention in the academic literature until re
cently. I began writing and lecturing in support of universalist ap
proaches in 1990.
The ALI Project began in 1994.
Professor
Rasmussen's proposal for a contractual approach to international
bankruptcy was published in 1997,29 while Professor LoPucki's critique
of universalism was published just last year.30 Some important work
has been done elsewhere in the last decade.31 On the whole, however,
the subject is just emerging in the academy.32

28. See ALI Statement, supra note 15.
29. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach].
30. SeeLynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation].
31. See, e.g., CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS, 12 UNITED
KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES (Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1990); IAN F. FLETCHER,
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1999) (hereinafter FLETCHER,
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY] ; PHILIP ST. J. SMART, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, 20708, 248 (1991); Charles D. Booth, Recognition Of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and

Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches Of United States Courts, 66 AM BANKR. L.J. 135
(1992); Douglas G. Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies,
36 INT. COMP. L.Q. 729 (1987); Jacob S. Ziegel, Ships at Sea, International Insolvencies, and
Divided Courts, 29 CAN. Bus. LJ. 417 (1998); see also Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of
International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543
(1996); David C. Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement, 21 Sw. J.L.
& Trade Am. 81 (1995). There have also been a significant number of helpful practice
oriented articles. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL LOAN
WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY (1987) (hereinafter 1987 ABA] ; RICHARD A. GITLIN &
RONA R. MEARS, INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (1989); John A.
Barrett, Various Legislative Attempts With Respect to Bankruptcies Involving More Than
One Country, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 557 (1998); Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman,
Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, TEX. INT'L L.J. 587 (1998); Bruce Leonard,
Managing Default by a Multinational Venture: Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvencies,
TEX. INT'L LJ. 543 (1998); Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Current Devel
opments in International Law and Practice, 45 Bus. LAW. 2273 (1990); Anne Nielson et al.,
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: General Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of
Cross-Border Insolvencies, 70 AM BANKR. L.J. 533, 543 (1996).
.

.

32. There was very important work done in the past, but then the subject was neglected.
See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught
by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1977); [hereinafter Nadelmann, Interna
tional Bankruptcy] KURT NADELMANN, CODIFICATION OF CONFLICTS RULES FOR
BANKRUPTCY 64-67 (1974), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31, 32 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights, 94th Cong. at 1457H. (1976); Kurt Nadelmann, Legal Treat
ment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 697 (1946)
[hereinafter Nadelmann, Legal Treatment]; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Status of Foreign Ad
ministrators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative Survey, 24 AM J. COMP. L. 288 (1976).
The standard work, although now out of print, remains 1 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY, PART II (1986).
.

Michigan Law Review

2282

[Vol. 98:2276

Broadly speaking, there are three academic positions: univer
salism, territorialism, and contractualism. The traditional positions are
the first two.33 According to the traditional territorialist approach,
each country would seize local assets and apply them for the benefit of
local creditors, with little or no regard for foreign proceedings. By
contrast, universalism is considered a system where one court adminis
ters the bankruptcy of a debtor on a worldwide basis with the help of
the courts in each affected country. Contractualism is an extension to
the international level of the contractual theories of bankruptcy ad
vanced in recent years. All three positions are represented in this
symposium.
The discussion that follows is divided into two parts. Part I de
scribes the ideal international system for managing the general default
of a multinational enterprise.34 It begins by distinguishing short-term
transitional solutions from long-term theoretical ones.
It then
sketches the theoretical background for determining the proper scope
of a bankruptcy law. It proceeds to describe the arguments for the
proposition that "universalism" is the correct theoretical solution for
the long term. Finally, it summarizes the argument that "modified
universalism" is the better short-term solution. Part II responds to the
positions taken in the prior articles by Professors Rasmussen and
LoPucki, with some reference to their new articles in this symposium.
It also comments upon Professor Guzman's article in this symposium.35
In the process, it spells out the case for "modified universalism" as the
best short-term transitional rule.36

II.
A.

A

UNIVERSALISM

Universalist Convention

Only in the last decade has the subject of transnational insolvency
evolved from an interesting rarity to a distinct and important category

33. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 10.
34. This discussion does not include natural persons, even those in business. In that re
gard, it follows the ALI Project. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at n.7. Bankruptcy of a
natural person implicates a host of very difficult social problems, including domestic rela
tions and property exemptions, that deserve a separate discussion, even in the international
context
35. As with any symposium, each of our papers is a moving target for the other partici
pants, so we may assume that none of us concedes anything by silence.
36. As with bankruptcy, the problem of multinational security interests is plagued by
transitional difficulties. See Neil B. Cohen & Edwin E. Smith, International Secured Trans
actions and Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHJ:.-KENT L. REV. 1191, 1221 (1999); Ryan E. Bull,
Note, Operation ofthe New Article 9 Choice Of Law Regime in an International Context, 78
TEXASL. REV. 679, 715 n.178 (2000) (recognizing that stark contrasts between the choice-of
law regime in the revised Article 9 and that of most other countries may create inefficiencies
in international secured transactions in the short and medium term).

June 2000]

A

Global Solution to Multinational Default

2283

in international finance and transnational litigation. In the midst of
that development, my focus has been on short-term, pragmatic re
sponses against the backdrop of a universalistic goal.37 Now that the
rush to globalization is still accelerating by the rise of the internet, it is
appropriate to approach the problem from the long view, elaborating
the best global bankruptcy system that might be created by a multina
tional convention on this subject.38
Professors LoPucki and
Rasmussen have done just that, presupposing adoption of multilateral
treaties on transnational bankruptcy.

1.

The Theoretical Background

Although this article is not the place to address at length larger
theories of bankruptcy, it is necessary to sketch the basic propositions
that underlie the case for universalism. The central theoretical point is
"market symmetry": the requirement that some systems in a legal re
gime must be symmetrical with the market, covering all or nearly all
transactions and stakeholders in that market with respect to the legal
rights and duties embraced by those systems.
Many legal systems vary within a market. They may differ region
ally, as with common law tort rules governed by state law in the
United States. The contract system allows for enormous variation by
virtue of publicly enforced private law created by contract. There is
also considerable variation by industry, through both legal enactments
and public enforcement of private codes and standard terms. Al
though there are always pressures to unify law to one degree or an
other at the level of the entire market, countervailing pressures to
maintain local autonomy, party autonomy, and industry practices typi
cally yield a pragmatic compromise in each field.
On the other hand, there are legal systems that cannot function ef
fectively unless their scope is symmetrical with the market. That is,
they must govern the interests of all parties throughout the market
whose interests may be implicated. A common example of such a sys
tem is the law of intellectual property, which in virtually all jurisdic
tions is co-extensive with a national market and which imposes rules
that govern the rights of all potential stakeholders, whether or not
they have contractual relationships inter se. Such systems are often,
but not invariably, considered to operate in rem, which may be a label

37. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Theory].
38. Both Professors LoPucki and Rasmussen assume such a treaty solution in their ma
jor articles on this subject. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 742; Rasmussen, A New
Approach, supra note 29, at 26 n.120. Professor Rasmussen does not imply a time frame for
such a treaty, while Professor LoPucki is ambiguous as to the temporal context for his pro
posal.
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reflecting the need to govern the rights of all possible stakeholders
throughout a market.
A legal system that requires a market-wide application may none
theless permit a considerable amount of variation by contract, by re
gional or industry rules, or otherwise, but it is characteristic of such
systems that they have a core of rules that cannot be governed by con
tract or other submarket systems precisely because those rules must
apply throughout the market to achieve their functional purposes.
Despite a lack of general agreement about bankruptcy theory,
there is a consensus that bankruptcy is a collective legal device that
operates in each case to protect and adjudicate the interests of many
stakeholders,39 even though there are disputes about the identity of the
stakeholders.40 From Jabez Henry to the participants in this sympo
sium,41 virtually all theorists have agreed that bankruptcy requires a
single proceeding in which all of the debtor's assets and claims are
administered under a single set of rules - in traditional terms, in rem.
To achieve that result, it is necessary that the bankruptcy law cover the
entire market in which the debtor company operates, and bind all of
its participants. It is therefore unsurprising that virtually every coun
try has established a national bankruptcy regime co-extensive with its
national market. Most tellingly, as with intellectual property law, vir
tually all federated countries, including those (like the United States)
that give considerable autonomy to regions (states) in business and
commercial matters, nonetheless insist that the bankruptcy regime be
national, to fit the national dimensions of the market.
That bankruptcy law must be ubiquitous does not mean it cannot
allow for variation and for private bargains. The bankruptcy systems
in many countries permit contractual priorities in the form of security
interests and permit regional policies considerable play, as, for exam
ple, in the role of state property and commercial laws in bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States. The bankruptcy system can permit
considerable flexibility at the level of parties or regions, without losing
its capacity to regulate the rights of all stakeholders throughout a na
tional market and regardless of a lack of contractual relationships

39. One oft-cited discussion is in THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC].
40. Both legal theories and legal systems differ on this point. For example, some regard
creditors as the only proper subjects of regard in bankruptcy, while others would consider
the interests of owners (debtors and their shareholders) as well. See, e.g., ElizabethWarren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cln. L. REV. 777 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Fo
rum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); KAREN
GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 138 (1997). See also IMF Report, supra note 2, at 7.
41. For Henry's interesting story, see FLETCHER, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, supra
note 31, at 17-19; see also JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 39; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Once Again:
Local Priorities in Bankruptcy, 38 AM. J. INT'LL. 370 (1944) [hereinafter Nadelmann, Local
Priorities].
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among stakeholders. In this way, the interests of secured parties, un
secured contract creditors, tort victims, taxing authorities, sharehold
ers, and other stakeholders can be resolved under a set of legal rules
known in advance and legitimately binding on them all.
Because the consensus is broad and consistent, a few examples of
the collective nature of bankruptcy should suffice. Two of the primary
functions of liquidation bankruptcy are to maximize asset value and to
distribute proceeds according to a scheme of priority based on legal
rights.42 The process cannot maximize the value of a debtor's assets
unless there is a moratorium or stay to prevent individual creditor sei
zures and a unified approach to assembling and selling those assets.43
Similarly, neither principles of equality nor a set of legal priorities can
have their desired effect unless they are applied in a common distribu
tion.44 Such a collective system cannot operate unless: i) the assets of
a debtor are part of a common pool for the benefit of stakeholders and
ii) the rights of all potential stakeholders are finally resolved prior to a
final distribution. Only a single system operating under a single set of
overall rules can achieve those unified results. A single system cannot
be legally effective unless it controls assets and binds stakeholders
throughout the market.
Reorganization bankruptcy (often called "rescue" elsewhere) is
even more dependant upon the existence of a single reorganization ac
tivity. Although some debtors, or corporate groups, may split neatly
into separate pieces to be sold or continued individually, most are
complexly structured, making it very difficult to continue the enter
prise without a substantially centralized direction.45 Reorganizing a
company is surgery upon a living being, as opposed to the disposal of
one that has expired. Interim financing and supervision of the com
pany's management are only two of the delicate functions that are dif
ficult to carry out by cooperation between distant judges. If the com
pany can be kept alive, the goal is a reorganization plan. Such a plan is
not achievable unless a court can bind all stakeholders to the reorgani
zation plan, including dissenters.46 Only a system that conclusively re
solves all stakeholders' legal rights can produce a financial restructur
ing that gives existing and future parties, including financiers,
investors, and employees, a sufficient guarantee of legal certainty.

42 See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 17.
43. See id. at 37. The ALI text provides examples.
44. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American
Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 484, 484 (1952) ("[T]he policy to consider all prop
erty wherever located part of the estate has practical advantages, besides being the only one
acceptable from the viewpoint of the equal distribution of all assets among all creditors.").

45. See infra text accompanying notes 158-164.
46. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 118.
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Without such assurances, a reorganization plan cannot go forward.
Such a system must be symmetrical to the market.
Turning to an ex ante perspective, to the extent that the outcomes
of bankruptcy affect the availability and terms of credit and other
forms of investment, predictability of outcome will tend to reduce
transaction costs and risk premiums.47 While high levels of predict
ability are never likely to be achievable in the context of general de
fault,48 material increases in predictability of outcomes will have be
nign efficiency effects ex ante. To the extent that a debtor's affairs are
governed by a single legal regime, predictability, and therefore effi
ciency, will be enhanced.
It is therefore not surprising that when the Founders of the
American Republic assembled to create a federation with a single na
tional market they gave the national government the power to govern
general defaults. Although bankruptcy occupies a privileged position
as one of the few enumerated powers given to Congress in Article I, it
received only cursory attention in the constitutional debates.49 The
likely reason is that the necessity for a single national law governing
such collective proceedings seemed self-evident.50 A sophisticated
American voter in 1788 might have been against a national market, or
thought its faults outweighed its virtues, but it would have been hard
to deny such a market should be served by a national bankruptcy sys
tem. It is especially noteworthy that the Founders did not think the
national market required national commercial laws, but left such mat
ters to the states. Bankruptcy was the commercial law uniquely re
quired at the national level. The compelling logic of this result is con-

47. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98
2179, 2181, 22fl7 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational
Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2255 (2000).
MICH. L. REV. 2177,

48. This point represents a hole in the literature that must be filled, although not by this
Article. A theoretical model relating to insolvency must reflect the reality that general de
fault produces considerable chaos and in many cultures, including our own, considerable liti
gation. To construct a model implicit with calm and deliberation is like a model of efficient
firefighting that assumes a leisurely encounter with the fire. To put the point another way,
there is an enormous potential for transaction costs built into the circumstance of general
default The minimization of those costs is one of the principal tasks of the theorist and the
policymaker. The costs must be accounted for in any solution that is modeled or the model
is useless. Assuming them away ignores the central problem, like the economist shipwrecked
on the desert island who proposes to solve the problem of opening a can of food by assuming
a can opener.
49. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 43, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 271 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1105 {1833) (noting that the Federalist Papers contain only a single refer
ence to the bankruptcy powers); Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the
Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator
Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 99-105 {1995) (discussing the few indications of the original
intent behind the bankruptcy power).
50. The importance of the task was outweighed for a long time by its difficulty. See infra
text accompanying note 110.
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firmed by the fact that similar systems are found in many nations with
federal structures.51 The historical experience has been that bank
ruptcy law is made coextensive with a market, so that national markets
require national bankruptcy laws, even where many other legal re
gimes are left to, or devolved to, a subsidiary level.52
Domestically, all of this is commonplace and almost universally ac
cepted.53 It is certainly common ground among the contributors to this
symposium. It follows that precisely the same logic will compel crea
tion of a single legal regime to govern general defaults at the interna
tional level as soon as that is achievable.54 Just as most commercial
and property law in the United States remains at the state level, it is
reasonable to assume that an international convention need not at
tempt to create an entire international commercial system.55 But in my
view it would certainly create a system administering a single bank
ruptcy law in a single, worldwide bankruptcy proceeding, if that were
politically possible. It would do so for exactly the same reasons that
have been compelling domestically, reasons that are even more cogent
internationally.
Because bankruptcy is a market-symmetrical law, a global market
requires a global bankruptcy law. A global default - that is, the gen
eral default of a multinational company - requires a single bank
ruptcy proceeding that can apply rules and reach results that are con
clusive with respect to all stakeholders throughout the global market.
Anything short of that procedure is, at best, a temporary accommoda
tion that awaits the political will to achieve the proper legal result.

51. With respect to the structural similarities between the members of NAFTA, see Jay
Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency
Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 13-14 (1997) ("In insolvency matters, all three [NAFTA]
jurisdictions have the same basic statutory structure, with state or provincial laws governing
most questions of contract and property, but with a federal insolvency law."). Additionally,
the new German Bankruptcy Code shares federal aspects with the United States. See
Manfred Baiz, Market Conformity OfInsolvency Proceedings: Policy Issues Of The German
Insolvency Law, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167 (1997); Kamiah, supra note 4.
52. One United States example is bankruptcy law at the national level, but the Co=er
cial Code at the state level.
53. A proposal was made in recent years to move bankruptcy to the state level, but it is
fair to say that it has not attracted any enthusiasm. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEXAS,L . REV. 471 (1994).
54. See Hannah Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Choice
of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 23, 60 (2000) (arguing for a single juris
diction internationally following the logic of domestic practice).
55. See Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & E=anuel Gaillard, Four
Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM . J. COMP. L. 573 (1994).
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Convergence ofLaws

The link between the consensus that a domestic bankruptcy law
must be contiguous with a national market and the present discussion
is, of course, the emergence of a global market. As noted above, there
are always pressures to make laws symmetrical with a market. As the
rush to globalization, reinforced by the internet, continues, there will
be increased pressure to establish global legal rules.56 For example,
there is great pressure for protection of endangered species, a value
that comes into apparent conflict with certain aspects of free trade.57
Nations will have to achieve some convergence on those questions to
resolve the conflict, typically through some combination of interna
tional rules and modification of the domestic rules in each country.
The best example we have is the European Union ("EU"), although
the larger world market offers important illustrations as well.
During the last half century, the development of the EU has dem
onstrated that international economic integration tends to generate le
gal convergence. Although some members would prefer a purely eco
nomic relationship, experience has shown that is not possible.
Economic issues are, after all, at the heart of many political issues and
the resolution of those issues typically becomes law, so that closer po
litical ties and converging laws inevitably accompany closer economic
integration.58 For example, economic integration inevitably leads to a

56. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A View from the Field: Some Observations on the
Effect ofInternational Commercial Law Reform on the Rule of Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBALLEG.
S. 497 (1999) [hereinafter Markell, Observations].
57. See GATI: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATI B.I.S.D. {39th
Supp.) at 155 (1993) (Dispute Settlement Panel Report); GATI United States Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, 33 l.L.M. 839 (1994) (Dispute Settlement Panel Report); United States
- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 36 l.L.M. 121 (World Trade
Org., Oct. 12, 1998) (Appellate Body Report). A recent case in the European Court of Jus
tice highlights the close connection between economic integration and integration of social
policy. See Case C-50196, A.G. v. Schroder, at 'll 54 (2000) (in the context of gender discrimi
nation in employment, one of the objectives of Article 119 of the EC Treaty "is to avoid a
situation in which [companies in State with laws requiring equal pay] suffer a competitive
disadvantage . . . as compared with [companies in States that have not]."). The issue of the
competitive connection between economic and social integration was a prominent subject at
an informal colloquium between members of the University of Texas Law School faculty and
members of the European Court of Justice in Austin, Texas, on April 21, 2000. The collo·
quium was sponsored by the Supreme Court of Texas.
58. Three different philosophies of Western European integration vied for adoption in
the immediate post-WW II era: federalism, functionalism, and neofunctionalism. The fed
eralist philosophy, represented by Rene Pleven, French premier in 1950, was based on the
view that unification would best be achieved by going to the heart of the matter and creating
supranational institutions with substantial power (e.g., an all-European army). The essence
of the federalist philosophy is reflected in the slogan "The worst way to cross a chasm is in
little steps." According to the functionalists, integration of states can be achieved best by
creating loosely knit organizations with authority only over technical economic tasks. As
one technical task would "spillover" into other areas, integration forces will become over
whelming. Neofunctionalists, led by Jean Monnet, believed that the integration process
should focus on creating supranational organizations for specific but politically significant
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conflict between the laws regulating the flow of goods and services in
the various integrating countries. France has always limited the word
"champagne" to a wine from a certain region of France, while other
European countries permitted it to be used more broadly to refer to a
type of sparkling wine wherever produced. If there was to be a single
market in wine, the legal conflict had to be resolved.59 Much the same
legal conflict existed with respect to the standard for something to be
called "beer."60 Although similar problems are arising globally,61 the
EU provides by far the largest and most useful example of conver
gence of laws as economic integration progresses.62
A few leading examples illustrate the process of convergence.
Early in the development of the EU, its members adopted a common
tax, the VAT.63 It has moved steadily toward convergence in taxation
ever since.64 It has also moved step-by-step closer to a universal labor
policy resting upon "the free movement of persons."65 The latter con
cept has produced results that would have been politically unthinkable
not so long ago. Increasingly, for example, lawyers and other profes
sionals licensed in one EU country must be permitted to practice in all

tasks (e.g., coal and steel industries). For a fuller discussion, see ERNST B. HAAS, THE
UNITING OF EUROPE {1958). The key point these philosophies had in common, which has
been demonstrated in the subsequent history of the European Community, is that economic
integration leads to political and legal convergence.
59. See Tattinger v. Allbev Ltd., [1992] F.S.R. 647 (Ch. Apr. 15, 1992); Tattinger v.
Allbev Ltd., [1993] F.S.R. 641 (Ch. Feb. 8, 1993), reported in THE TIMES (London), Feb. 11,
1993, at 2, available in LEXIS, NexisLibrary, Alleur File.
60. See Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, 1268-72.
61. Another example is the movement toward convergence of rules concerning securi
ties because of the globalization of the capital markets. See, e.g., lNT'L FIN L. REV., U.S.
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT (1999).
.

62. By a paradox more apparent than real, it also increases the pressure for devolution
and subsidiarity as to certain kinds of issues. See, e.g., Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An
Effective Barrier Against "the Enterprises of Ambition"?, 17 EUR. L. REV. 383 (1992) (dis
cussing the role of subsidiarity in the EU).
63. See TREATY EsTABLISIIlNG
1957, art. 99, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 76.

THE

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,

64. Recently, the issue of withholding taxes from savings has proven controversial, see
Dominic Hobson, Mobile Capital: Outrunning the Tax Man, WALL ST. J. EUR. 10, Mar. 16,
2000, yet the convergence of European taxation continues. Since January 1, 1993, the EU
countries have had a standard minimum VAT rate of fifteen percent, with reduced rates of
no less than five percent on specified categories of goods and services. See Jan E.
Brinkmann & Andreas 0. Riecker, European Community Taxation: The Ruding Committee
Report Gives Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 lNT'L LAW. 1061, 1063 n.6 (1993).
Recently, the idea of EU-wide internet taxation is gaining popularity. See John Kennedy,
Taxing the Net: The European Union is Keen to Implement a Framework for Applying VAT
on Internet Transactions, Bus. AND FIN Oct. 22, 1998.
.,

65. See Harry Valetk, Note, "I Cannot Eat Air!": An Economic Analysis of Interna
tional Immigration Law for the 21st Century, 7 CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP L. 141, 174
(1999) (summarizing the development of EU labor policies).
.
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the rest.66 Students who are qualified must be admitted without dis
crimination in schools throughout the Union.67
Similarly, the free movement of services has enabled companies of
fering finance and banking services to operate everywhere in the Un
ion with dwindling territorial restraints,68 a development closely tied to
the Euro and the establishment of a European Central Bank.69 The
pressures of globalization will create similar convergences throughout
the world - indeed, are already doing so.70 There are endless inter
esting questions about how all this can be managed politically and how
fast it will develop, but there can be no serious question about the
trend.

66. See generally Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community: Progress To·
wards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556 (1992); Bernhard
Schloh, Freedom of Movement of Lawyers within the European Economic Community, 9 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83 (1990); Diane M. Venezia, Note, An EU Lawyer's Right to Prac
tice Throughout the European Union, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 427 (1995).
67. See THE HERALD, Feb. 19, 2000 (United Kingdom).
68. See Maria Szonert-Binienda, Passporting Financial Services Throughout the Euro
pean Union, 116 BANKING L.J. 456 (1999); Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Note, An International
Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second Banking Di
rective Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates Its Own Financial Services Indus
try?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1715, 1731-38 (1999) (reviewing the EU's liberal approach to
regulation of the financial services industry).
69. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 15 (1999) ("[W)ith the introduction of the euro, a window of opportu
nity has opened for integrating financial services.").
70. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994) (patent); The Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (copyright).
Antitrust presents a similar trend toward convergence of laws. There are a number of
commentaries on the influence of U.S. antitrust laws on other countries. "The success of the
United States in curbing anticompetitive behavior in its domestic markets led South Korea
and Japan to adopt antitrust laws similar to those of the United States." Danny Abir, Mo
nopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 13 INT'L
TAX & Bus. L. 143, 143 (1996). "Because Taiwan began with a tabula rasa regarding anti
trust law, the Fair Trade Law was patterned primarily after the antitrust laws of advanced
industrial states - notably Japan, South Korea, Germany, and the United States."
Lawrence L.C. Lee, Taiwan's Antitrust Statutes: Proposals for A Regulatory Regime and
Comparison of U.S. and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 595
(1996). There is growing cooperation internationally in the antitrust area as well. See, e.g.,
U.S. Backs International Merger Body in Move to Ease Regulatory Friction, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 15, 2000 (call for international regulation of mergers, reversing long-held U.S. policy);
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities (Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/internationaUdocs/3740.htm> reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Anti
trust Div., Press Release, United States and Japan Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement
(Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/3739.htm>; Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia
on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance (Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/internationaUdocs/usaus7.htm>, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Press Release, Attorney General Signs Antitrust Assistance Agreement with Australia (Apr.
27, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_release/1999/2382.htm>.
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Professor LoPucki quotes me as saying that a rough similarity of
laws is necessary to universalism.71 What I have in mind by such a
statement is this general convergence of laws. Professor LoPucki's
implication is that I am conceding that universalism will not be achiev
able for a very long time, because laws will long remain dissimilar. On
the contrary, it is my sense that global economic integration is driving
convergence of law at a surprisingly fast pace and this trend will make
it possible to achieve a workable international bankruptcy system
much sooner than might have been thought.72
This general convergence of law yields a mix of international rules
and modification of local rules. In those fields that require market
symmetry, however, there will always be pressure for market-wide
rules. Again, the EU experience is illustrative. In the field of intellec
tual property, which must also be market symmetrical, there is now a
European Patent Office.73 Although there are still national patent of
fices in Europe, the European office represents a very significant in
ternationalization.74
Even more directly to the point, the EU has now adopted an insol
vency regulation governing cooperation in cross-border insolvency
matters.75 While the regulation is only a modest first step, it is most
significant that its recitals base its adoption on the need for market
wide regulation.76 It specifically states that "[t]he proper functioning
of the internal market requires that cross-border insolvency proceed
ings should operate efficiently and effectively . . . ." and that " [t]he ac
tivities of undertakings have more and more cross-border effects and

71. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bank
ruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2216 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality].
Of course, I did not say similar laws are necessary to modified universalism, my proposed
interim approach.
72 See generally Markell, Observations, supra note 56; Spencer Weber Waller, The In
ternationalization ofAntitrust Enforcement, 11 BOSTON U. L. REV. 343 (1997).
73. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, as amended by Decision of the
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 13 l.L.M.
268.
74. See Vivian S. Kuo & Gerald J. Mossinghoff, World Patent System Circa 20xx, A.D,
38 IDEA 529, 541-42 (1998).
Under the EPC system, it is possible to file a single patent application with the European
Patent Office ("EPO") in one of the three official languages - English, French and German
- and obtain patent protection in one, several or all of thenineteen contracting states if the
applicant so desires. An issued patent from the EPC confers on the inventor the same rights
as would be conferred by a national patent granted in a designated state. However, this ap
plication effort does not result in a single Community patent. Applicants to theEPO receive
a series of patents, akin to a 'bundle of rights,' enforceable in each member state designated
by theapplicant. Patent rights areenforced by the respective courts of the member states as
if thepatents wereissued by each stateindividually.
Id.
75. See EU Regulation, supra note25.
76. See id. at Recitals 2-4, 8.
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are therefore increasingly being regulated by Community law."77 The
text goes on to imply that movement to a community-wide proceeding
"with universal scope" is not attempted only because "it is not practi
cal."78 While this regulation demonstrates the difficulty of achieving
legal integration in the complex field of insolvency, it also provides the
most important contemporary example of the way in which economic
integration exerts inexorable pressure toward universalism.

3.

A

Unified Law and Forum

There are two elements necessary to a universalist convention for
international bankruptcy: a single law and a single forum to govern
each multinational case. These two elements are distinct and need not
necessarily be conjoined in an international bankruptcy system, al
though ideally they would be.79 Either could be achieved, at least in
theory, by two different approaches - unified international institu
tions, or a unified set of conflicts rules. The first approach would es
tablish a single international bankruptcy law and a single international
bankruptcy court system, while the second would prescribe a uniform
set of choice-of-law rules and choice-of-forum rules. However, choice
of-law rules are notoriously nonuniform and unpredictable, so a single
law is, in principle, much more desirable from an ex ante perspective.
Experience with the Restatement Second in the United States demon
strates the difficulty in achieving predictable choice-of-law results with
any rule, no matter how carefully and insightfully crafted the text may
be.80 A single forum also would be desirable because some of the
same problems exist with choice-of-forum rules,81 and multiple fora
present problems of inconsistent administration.
A single international system of bankruptcy courts would achieve
many of the benefits provided domestically by a single, national bank
ruptcy law.82 Admittedly, a court in such a system would still have

77. Id. at Recitals 2 & 3. The phrase "internal market" means the community-wide
market.
78. Id. at Recital 11.
79. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37.
80. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Pro
posal for Torts Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 446 (2000) (recognizing that the flexibility re
quired from a conflicts Restatement renders precision, and hence predictability, more diffi
cult); Russell J. Weintraub, "At Least Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of
Contracts Meet the Hippocratic Oath?, 56 MD. L. REv. 1284, 1315 (1997) (same).
81. See FLETCHER, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 31, at 771.
82. The text of the ALI's Principles sets forth the principal benefits of a centralized in
ternational bankruptcy system. As the foregoing discussion indicates, a single international
court applying a single international bankruptcy law would best achieve each of those objec
tives. This discussion follows the listing of the major benefits of bankruptcy in the ALI
Statement, supra note 15, at 17, and is similar to those identified in the IMF Report, supra
note 2, at 81-82.
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many choice-of-law decisions to make in determining the proper na
tional law to apply with respect to various pre-bankruptcy claims and
property rights. Nonetheless, administration by a single court system,
applying a single set of choice-of-law rules with some hope of consis
tency, would produce a far higher level of predictability in commercial
transactions than we now have.
A single court would maximize asset values, even in liquidation, by
providing a unified approach to assembly and sale of assets as a whole.
If it commanded a worldwide stay, it could most effectively protect
those assets prior to sale. Establishment of such a court would make
preventing or undoing debtor fraud far easier and more certain, an es
pecially urgent goal in a world of electronic funds transfers and asset
protection trusts.83
A single court would improve dramatically the possibility of reor
ganization. With a single court to whom the manager of the reorgani
zation could report and a single mechanism for adjusting the interests
of stakeholders, the possibility of saving a sprawling multinational
corporation would be greatly increased. For example, the ease of or
ganizing and administering the necessary post-petition financing84 and
the greater certainty of the lender's protection on a worldwide basis
would increase the availability of credit and reduce interest rates. A
single court that was part of an international court system would also
lower the risk of parochialism in the administration of the case.
A single international bankruptcy law would also confer unique
benefits. It would create a single set of priorities and method of distri
bution, ensuring equality for stakeholders with similar legal rights eve
rywhere in the world.85 Perhaps most important to the stability and ef
ficiency of the global commercial community, it would provide one
consistent set of transfer-avoidance rules (such as preference and
fraudulent conveyance avoidance), so that creditors would know the
rules and would know they were protected against strategic behavior
by debtors and other creditors. These are two separate points, each of

83. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th
Cir. 1999) (offshore asset protection trusts are intended to create a scenario whereby a "de
fendant can assert that compliance with a court's order to repatriate the trust assets is impos
sible"); In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1999) (imposing high burden of proof
on debtor seeking to avoid a turnover order because of asset protection trust). See generally,
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It
Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994) (describing various approaches to asset protection); T.
Moers Mayer, Will the Lawyers Pay? Counsel's Ethical, Civil and Criminal Exposure for
Creating Offshore Asset Protection Trusts (Spring Meeting of the Business Law Committee
of the ABA, Apr. 5, 1997) (discussing the ethical and legal implications of asset protection
trusts for the lawyers that form them).
84. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 365 (1994); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THELAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 530-31 (3d ed. 1996).
85. The present territorial system virtually ensures that no nation's ideas of efficiency
and fairness are followed. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 461.
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some importance. Because creditors would know the avoidance rules
that would be applied, they could confidently structure loans and
workouts within those rules. They would have some incentive to es
chew transfers and other transactions that violate economic policy,
thus enforcing that policy and avoiding very expensive litigation.86 At
the same time, they could obtain reliable legal opinions that certain
approaches to restructuring the finances of a distressed debtor would
pass muster if the restructuring failed and bankruptcy followed.
Such predictability in avoidance rules would have another favor
able impact on out-of-court workouts. Where such rules are consis
tently enforced, creditors attempting to reach a consensual restruc
turing can be reasonably sure that secret deals with certain creditors or
other persons could be unraveled in the event of general default. Pro
viding that protection is one of the most important functions of avoid
ance rules. In both respects, then, creditors would have the relative
predictability and workout protection they enjoy now in legally sophis
ticated societies.
Is a single international bankruptcy law administered by a single
international court system87 possible in the foreseeable future? It is
implausible, but not, I think, impossible. Political predictions are al
ways unreliable and I have nothing to offer in support of mine except a
fair amount of recent experience in the politics of international insol
vency reform.88 We do have exemplary methods of achieving such re
sults. Twenty-five years ago, the idea of an international forum with
the power effectively to overrule a United States court would have
been inconceivable to many, but the NAFTA trade tribunals are em
powered to do that, albeit indirectly.89 The Law of the Sea Treaty has

86. The problems are well illustrated by In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R.
800 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 186 B.R. 807 {S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir.
1996).
87. I say "court system," because it is unlikely that a convention would establish a single
court, like the International Court of Justice at the Hague, to administer a vital part of a
global commercial system. It is much more likely that there would be regional courts or, in
the case of the largest economies, international courts devoted to bankruptcies centered in a
single country. These courts might be limited purpose commercial courts and more like arbi·
tration tribunals than traditional courts. There are many interesting details, but they are not
for this Article. I use "court" and "court system" interchangeably in this article, as clarity
and ease of expression require, but I will always mean a court system in this context.
88. I am the United States Reporter for the ALI Transnational Insolvency Project and
the co-chair of the United States delegation to UNCITRAL in connection with bankruptcy
matters. I also serve as a consultant to the International Monetary Fund on such matters and
I am a member of the Insolvency Task Force of theWorld Bank.
89. In cases involving anti-dumping and countervailing duty issues, parties to the
NAFTA may appeal national court rulings to a bilateral panel. See North American Free
Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Art. 1904(2), 32
I.L.M. 605, 683 ("NAFTA"). The rulings of these panels, based on the substantive law of the
importing country, are binding upon the parties and not subject to judicial review in national
courts. See id.; § 19 U.S.C.A. 1516a(g)(2) (Supp. 1997) (exclusive review by binational pan
els); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA: A PROBLEM ORIENTED CASEBOOK 465 (2000).
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created an Authority that may someday have both administrative and
adjudicatory power over an important percentage of the world's
wealth under the seas.90 And, of course, the European Court of Justice
has become a truly international court with "direct effect" on persons
and companies throughout Europe and around the world.91
There is a sharper international sting in a patent's tail nowadays,
because of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") provisions linking intellectual property rights to trade
privileges under the WT0.92 A linkage of this sort makes an interna
tional rule more nearly enforceable in the sense that a domestic rule of
law is enforceable. The linkage is plausible because of the close con
nection between intellectual property and the free flow of trade and
investment.93 It may be that the excesses of intellectual-property law
will produce a backlash against this sort of linkage.94 If not, linkages of
Already, cases have challenged the constitutionality of this procedure, but thus far have not
met with success. See American Coalition For Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (dismissing constitutional challenge to review of national rulings by a bina
tional NAFfA panel and affirming constitutionality of the treaty-based exhaustion require
ment).
90. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted
LAW OFTHE SEA, U.N. Doc. Al CONF. 62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983).

in THE

91. See, e.g., Eric F. Hinton, Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community Law: Direct
Effect, Article 5 EC, and the European Court ofJustice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 308
(1999) ("Much of European integration has been legal integration, and at the forefront of
the integration movement has been the European Court of Justice."). As to its worldwide
impact, one example is its interpretation of the competition rules of article 85 of the Treaty
of Rome. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, arts. 85-94, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, amended by Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,
1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573. That interpretation is binding on the European
Commission, which in turn can effectively veto mergers of multinationals centered outside
the EU. See, e.g., Andre Fiebig, The Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger
Control Regulation, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 79 (1998); Crystal Jones-Starr, Community-Wide v.

Worldwide Competition: Why European Enforcement Agencies Are Able to Force American
Companies to Modify Their Merger Proposals and Limit Their Innovations, 17 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 145 (1999); Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need For Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the
Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (all discussing the world-wide impact of the
European Commission's stated doubts about whether the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger would be consistent with EU competition laws).
92. At least two symposia have discussed the impact of the TRIPS provisions on intellec
tual property issues. See Symposium, Public and Private Initiatives After TRIPS, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1998); Symposium, Intellectual Property Law in the International Mar

ketplace - Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Right: Enforcement and Dispute
Resolution 37 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
93. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders To Fair Followers: Global Competi
tion Under The TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997).
94. Both domestically and internationally, there are claims that recent strengthening of
the intellectual property laws may have gone too far in limiting free trade and innovation.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283
(1996) (proposing the "democratic paradigm" as a method for successfully balancing protec
tion of intellectual property with the goal of innovation); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright For
Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 153-54 (1998) (contending policymakers, in
broadening copyright protection to offer additional incentive or reward to creators, may
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that sort might be used to develop other international commercial re
gimes, like a bankruptcy law, that can similarly claim a close connec
tion to encouragement of truly global trade and investment.
The WTO is a global forum with real teeth.95 The United States,
for example, has simply ignored the rulings of the World Court,96 but
takes very seriously rulings from a WTO panel.97 The WTO example
makes it no longer easy to dismiss a proposal for a truly international
forum to administer rules relating to worldwide commerce. If bank
ruptcy law were to follow intellectual property law in being tied to the
GAIT, it would have similar international leverage.
Another approach would be the Bilateral Investment Treaties
("BITs") that the United States and other capital-exporting countries
have negotiated with a number of countries.98 Membership in an in
ternational bankruptcy system, providing for a single law and a single
forum, might easily become a standard term sought in such treaties. A
bankruptcy system is especially important to investors, so its inclusion
in BITs would be wholly appropriate. Certain crucial aspects of bank
ruptcy law, like the treatment of taxes, could be covered in the spe-

have lost sight of whether additional reward was necessary or justified). But see David
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673,
739-40 (2000) (arguing that the new copyright act insufficiently protects copyright holders).
95. Its supporters don't like the characterization "arbitrators," and its opponents don't
like "court." Forum is a neutral term.
96. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. REP. 392 (Judg·
ment of Nov. 26). The United States official statement of withdrawal from the case may be
found in U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, Jan. 18,
1985, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14 (Judgment of June 27). For
discussion of the case, and the effect of the United States withdrawal on the influence of the
International Court of Justice, see, for example, Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States,
and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); W. Michael Reisman, The Other Shoe
Falls: The Future ofArticle 36(1) Jurisdiction in Light of Nicaragua, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 166
(1987).
97. While the United States blatantly disregards the International Court of Justice when
needs require, it has consistently engaged the WTO despite disagreeing often with \VfO
rulings. Recently, within a few months following a WTO ruling against a United States tax
subsidy for exports, the United States promptly proposed substantial changes in its tax law to
accommodate the ruling. See, e.g., U.S. Offers to Satisfy WTO Ruling By Ending Tax Break
for Exporters, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2000 (proposal to amend U.S. tax law to satisfy adverse
ruling by WTO panel on U.S. tax-subsidy provision). Another recent example comes from
the conflict with Europe over the EU's refusal to import beef products enhanced by growth
hormones. Statement Of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Secretary For International
Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, Before the House Comm. on International Rela
tions, June 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 20008799 ("The United States will respect the
WTO process and participate fully in [the beef importation] arbitration process.").
98. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Ex
plaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998);
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 621 (1993) (discussing the historical and modem uses of BITs for the United States).
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cialized treaties being routinely negotiated and re-negotiated in spe
cialized fields.99
The remarkable movement toward globalization and legal conver
gence has recently been epitomized by the Model Law on Cross
Border Insolvency.100 The announcement of this project by the United
National Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") in
1995 was greeted by widespread pessimism that any treaty or model
law on the subject of bankruptcy could be achieved. The promulga
tion of the Model Law by UNCITRAL and its prospective adoption
by leading commercial nations101 reflect the compelling logic of inter
national cooperation in this field.
As noted above, there is a worldwide wave of domestic bankruptcy
law reform currently building to a crest.102 It has been stimulated in
significant part by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, whose interest was aroused by the East Asian crisis, but the re
form wave pre-dates that interest and has broader causes.103 In signifi
cant part, it is a response to the rapidly changing methods and scope of
international finance and the concerns of investors about the man
agement of risk. Given current trends and given the close connection
between bankruptcy and investment risk, it is possible that a truly uni
fied international bankruptcy system could be achieved.

If so, we would then have a system both "universal" and "unitary,"
a single law administered by a single court. This result would be true
"universalism."104 The other three authors in this symposium have not
really addressed universalism in this sense in their prior writings. Nei
ther have I. But surely universalism so understood must be accepted
as the best long-term solution for multinational bankruptcies.105 Given
that all modem bankruptcy theories assume a collective regime, and
given that virtually all countries have national bankruptcy laws, co
terminous with their national markets and transcending their regional
governments, it is hard to imagine a bankruptcy scholar rejecting uni
versalism as the correct ultimate goal internationally. It seems likely
99. The ALI Statement proposes that the difficult problem of coordinating or accom
modating domestic tax priorities in a multinational bankruptcy be addressed by treaty. See
ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 19. The numerous, ongoing tax-treaty negotiations be
tween the United States and its friends are an obvious place to start.
100. MODEL LAW, supra note 16.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 2-15.
103. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Globalization of Insolvency Reform, 1999 NEW
ZEALAND L. REV. 401, 402-03.
104. I have led the way in avoiding the traditional terms, "universalist" and "unitary," in
referring to a single law and a single forum. See Trautman et al., supra note 55, at 587. They
have become less useful for various reasons, including ambiguous usage and a lack of con
nection with the rest of modem conflicts analysis.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 82 and 87.
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that our differences relate to shorter-term and transitional solutions,
which are much more difficult.

4.

The Continuing Role ofNational Policies

There is one argument against complete universalism even in the
long term: that a single international law would give insufficient play
to domestic policies in each nation. This argument must be distin
guished from the political claim that national policies will remain
sharply different in the short and medium term, making universalism
impractical. That claim has considerable force and may delay a treaty
establishing universalism for a long time. The theoretical argument is
that a single international bankruptcy regime will suppress necessary
and important differences in policy among still-distinct national socie
ties and cultures. There are three reasons that need not be true.
The first is that, just as state law is prevalent in domestic bankrupt
cies in the United States and other federated states, most of the law
applied in an international bankruptcy case will continue to be na
tional law. Indeed, even rules about priority of distribution can be
kept at the national level to some extent under an international bank
ruptcy law. Our domestic practice is instructive. Security interests and
other liens created under state law are routinely applied in a federal
bankruptcy case, with limited exceptions for certain lien priorities that
Congress has determined inappropriate in the bankruptcy context.106
Thus each state is allowed, within limits, to grant priorities in bank
ruptcy distributions. Using the lien device, a universalist bankruptcy
law could allow play to national priorities, within limits. For example,
it could permit enforcement of liens or oth�r priorities against work
product produced by contractors, just as Congress has done.107 Similar
national priorities could be enforced with respect to employees, tort
victims, or others within an agreed international framework.
The second reason we need not be concerned about universalism
leaving too little room for local policies is that we have the option of
applying an international regime only to companies of a certain size or
a certain level of international activity. Limited application of a uni
versalist regime only to large multinationals would permit local poli106. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 {1994).
107. See, e.g., id. {permitting avoidance of some state-law liens, but not others). See also
LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 746. Professor LoPucki suggests that under univer
salism foreign courts would be enjoining United States environmental laws and othenvise
imposing on United States policies. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at
122-23. That result is obviously neither necessary nor conceivable in any universalist system
we would accept. His example is a Brazilian stay of the application of environmental laws to
a debtor's operations in the United States. A stay's effect in a universalist system undoubt
edly would be subject to the same police-power exception we have in our national law. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(b){4). Among many other things, that exception protects the continuing ap
plication of state environmental laws. A universalist system would work in a similar way.
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cies to be applied to local enterprises. As subsequent discussion will
show, many local policies cannot be applied effectively to multination
als,103 so little is lost locally by international governance of multina
tionals. Finally, as noted at the start, this discussion focuses on com
mercial entities - corporations and perhaps very rich individuals rather than on consumers. It is likely that a universalist treaty would
do the same, leaving the most sensitive questions of social policy to
domestic law.109
B.

Interim Solutions

To this point, I have argued that the proper long-term, theoretical
solution to the problem of multinational insolvency is universalism,
whether or not such a solution is achievable in the foreseeable future.
Although I am more optimistic than others, universalism may not be
obtainable in the foreseeable future. To fashion such a system would
require international consensus as to many questions that could not be
left to domestic law. Even with global legal convergence, such a con
sensus may take a long time to achieve. To balance the fact that the
Founders of the United States regarded a national bankruptcy law as
essential, enacting one about a decade after the Constitution was
adopted, we must consider that our ancestors did not succeed in fash
ioning a workable bankruptcy law for more than a hundred years. The
nineteenth-century laws each lasted only a few years.U0 Not until 109
years after the adoption of the Constitution did the United States
achieve a permanent bankruptcy law. Our friends in the EU labored
for more than thirty years to create a Union-wide bankruptcy re
gime.111 Because there is room for pessimism as to when a bankruptcy
treaty might be achieved, a discussion of transitional approaches is in
order. What follows is an overall summary, postponing responses to
specific arguments raised by others until the next section.
The Statement of Principles adopted by the American Law Insti
tute summarizes the current taxonomy of reform:

Marious reform efforts can be characterized as based on modified
universalism or modified territorialism, where those two concepts lie be
tween the ends of a spectrum from universalism to territorialism. Modi
fied universalism is universalism tempered by a sense of what is practical
at the current stage of international legal development, while modified
territorialism represents a movement away from territorialism in recogni
tion of the increasing integration of the world economy. . . .

108. See infra text preceding note 150.
109. See supra text accompanying note 34.
110. See generally Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
111. See FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 247.
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Aside from universalism and territorialism, there is a second dichot
omy that is distinct from that one, yet overlaps it sufficiently to confuse
understanding. The second dichotomy is between "ancillary" and "par
allel" proceedings. A multinational bankruptcy must nearly always in
volve some sort of judicial proceeding in more than one country, because
judicial orders will be necessary to control assets during reorganization
or liquidation. The proceeding in the debtor's home country, often
called the "main" proceeding . . . will always be a full bankruptcy under
its domestic law. The judicial proceedings in other countries may be or
dinary lawsuits, ancillary proceedings, or parallel proceedings. An ordi
nary lawsuit may serve, for example, to gain control of a particular asset,
but often more all-embracing solutions are required as a matter of speed
and efficiency. In some jurisdictions those solutions will be in the form
of an ancillary proceeding while other jurisdictions will prefer a parallel
proceeding. An ancillary proceeding is designed primarily to aid the
"main" proceeding in the debtor's home country. It does not contem
plate a full administration and distribution of the debtor's local assets.

Instead, as discussed infra, the court in the ancillary proceeding might is
sue injunctions against creditor lawsuits and seizures and provide a for
eign administrator with assistance in gaining information about local as
sets.112

By contrast, a "parallel" proceeding is a full bankruptcy under domes
tic law. The court in a parallel proceeding administers the debtor's lo
cal assets in parallel with the administration in the main proceeding.
The court in a parallel proceeding will generally have control over the
debtor's domestic assets and over creditor actions by virtue of the
usual stays and other powers available in the domestic bankruptcy law,
so the relief available to an administrator acting in the main proceed
ing will be in the nature of cooperation.
Modified universalism is the approach that I have suggested as an
interim or transitional solution. I believe that the "cooperative territo
rialism" proposed by Professor LoPucki in his Cornell article is one
form of modified territorialism. The operation of modified univer
salism is illustrated by In re Culmer,113 one of the leading cases decided
under section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. There, a Bahamian corpo
ration had assets in the United States and creditors had attached those
assets, giving them certain priority rights under United States law.
The Bahamian liquidators brought a petition under section 304 seek
ing a stay of the United States collection actions and turnover of the
assets for distribution in the Bahamian proceeding. That they suc
ceeded in both requests reflected the court's universalist view: be
cause the Bahamian action satisfied the statute's choice-of-forum

112. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 11-12.
113. 25 B.R 621, 629 (Banicr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). The case law under section 304 is dis
cussed infra at note 197.
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rule,114 ancillary relief was indicated. The universalist perspective was
emphasized by the fact that the relief included turnover of assets, in
effect dispatching the creditors to the Bahamas to assert their claims .
On the other hand, the court did not grant the relief until it had satis
fied itself that Bahamian law could be trusted to be fair and was in
general terms similar to United States law. That inquiry justifies the
adjective "modified," because the deference to the preferred univer
salist forum was not automatic, but required a practical finding of fair
ness and rough similarity. Presumably, a court committed to coopera
tive territorialism would have denied the petition, leaving the
liquidators or other creditors to bring a full parallel United States
bankruptcy, in which the court might cooperate on some level with the
foreign court, but only within limits ensuring that creditors in the
United States proceeding were given first access to the United States
assets.115
The key difference between the two approaches is that modified
universalism takes a worldwide perspective, seeking solutions that
come as close as possible to the ideal of a single-court, single-law
resolution, while territorialism of any sort seems to me to be defined
by a conviction that local creditors have vested rights in whatever as
sets can be seized by their courts when insolvency looms. The first
formulation of modified universalism described it thusly:

[Modified universalism] accepts the central premise of universalism, that
assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but re
serves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home
country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors. The

6
leading example is Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. . . .11

If the worldwide perspective is the appropriate one for a worldwide
market, the view adopted by the ALI,117 then merely adding a hopeful
gloss of cooperation to a territorial system will not do. The reason is
that cooperation will be greatly limited by the rigidities of the domes
tic bankruptcy laws of each country. For example, once a full bank
ruptcy is opened in a country, its local law tends to establish strict rules
on priority and the priority systems in each country differ greatly.118
The consequences are described in the ALI statement:
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2000) (defining a foreign proceeding in terms of indicia of
the center of the debtor's business for the purpose of ancillary relief under section 304).
115. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 748-51.
116. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice ofAvoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 517 (1991).
117. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 39 (discussing "General Principle V: Sharing
of Value").
118. See generally JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES, MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW, EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ROY GOODE 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities,
33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27 (1998).

2302

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:2276

Distribution in bankruptcy rests on a body of substantive rules central to
the process in each country . . . . In a transnational case, each court that
is making a distribution in a local bankruptcy proceeding must apply its
national distribution rules, including rules as to security and other priori
ties. In each country, those rules are relatively inflexible in liquidation
cases. The national rules may leave more room for accommodation and
compromise in reorganization proceedings, but they still impose signifi
cant legal constraints.
The difficulties created by differing priority systems constitute one of
the major complications of parallel proceedings. A creditor or group of
creditors that is the beneficiary of a domestic priority may assert that this
right to priority in distribution must trump an effort at cooperation,
whether it be cooperation in a plan of reorganization, by transfer of as
sets, or otherwise. Such assertions could block any important attempt at
cooperation.

Priority rules may be unwaivable except by unanimous

agreement, a standard that encourages certain parties to "hold out" for
their personal advantage despite agreement among the great majority of
creditors, both privileged and general.119

The inevitable consequence is that real cooperation in a territorial sys
tem is necessarily very limited. Instead, recoveries will turn on the for
tuitous or manipulated location of assets and the results will be highly
unpredictable ex ante. Modified universalism attempts to achieve
some of the benefits of universalism in a multi-forum, multi-law world.
It requires each court to become part of an international system for
maximizing value and fairness in the management of the default. In
either an ancillary or parallel approach under national law, modified
universalism permits the court to view the default and its resolution
(liquidation or reorganization) from a worldwide perspective and to
cooperate with other courts to produce results as close to those that
would arise from a single proceeding as local law will permit.120 Be
cause it will develop experience, methods, and precedents through
such cooperation, modified universalism will provide essential back
ground for the development of a convention establishing a universalist
system. In the meantime, modified universalism is an awkward, in
terim solution.
I hope to show in the next part, to paraphrase
Churchill, that it is the worst transitional system, except for all the
others.121

119. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 116.
120. See In re Maxwell Communications, Inc., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
121. See WINSTON CHuRCHILL, Speech in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), re
printed in 7 WINSTON s. CHuRCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at 7566 (Robert
Rhodes James ed., 1974) ("Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in
this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it
has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time.").
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ill. AN APPRECIATION AND CRITIQUE OF OTHER VIEWS
A.

Professor Rasmussen

Professor Rasmussen is not only an accomplished scholar, but a
kind of universalist, so I naturally find things to admire in his contrac
tual-menu approach to international insolvency. He proposes adop
tion of a single insolvency law worldwide, as I do,122 although he does
not propose a single court system to administer it. Just as I would en
vision my ideal bankruptcy law being internationalized, he envisions
taking to an international level the contractual-menu approach to
bankruptcy that he has advocated domestically. Each company would
be free to select a bankruptcy regime to govern it in case of its general
default. The choice would be made in its articles of incorporation and
would be unchangeable without the approval of its creditors. I would
suppose he would favor a privatized administration to go with the pri
vatized provisions of his insolvency menu, perhaps in the form of arbi
tral tribunals.
One of the attractive elements in Professor Rasmussen's approach
is that he does not forget that government will have to enforce the re
gime he proposes. Another attractive element is that the lawmaker's
job is very simple. Thus, an international convention would presuma
bly provide that all the contracting countries would enforce the re
quirement that every company's article of incorporation contain a
choice-of-bankruptcy procedure from the menu and that the choice
could not be changed without the agreement of every creditor. Each
state would further agree to enforce the choice made. This proposal
would create a great many transitional problems with countries that
had not adopted the convention, but that is true of every proposal.123
With regard to Professor Rasmussen's criticism of a non
contractual universalism, his arguments are similar to those he has di
rected at the domestic bankruptcy system. They rest almost entirely
on the claim that parties will contract around any set of rules and the
result must therefore be inefficient. To that extent, he joins many oth
ers in giving us Coase Without Costs, ignoring the possibility that the
rules may create a system that is sufficiently close to the most efficient
possible that it is not worthwhile to contract around it or that it is
122. Although Professor Rasmussen tucks this point into a footnote, he there concedes
that it would be difficult to gain enforcement of his menu approach without an international
agreement on the menu options. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 29, at 26
n.120. In fact, I say with some confidence that the menu approach is highly unlikely to be
accepted without an international agreement on options. Absent such agreement, there
would be a very complex and likely unworkable checkboard pattern of enforcement. Thus, I
address the proposal in terms of such an agreement.
123. I would assert that universalism would create fewer transitional problems, espe
cially in a world that has embraced modified universalism, but I will not pursue that point
here.
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worthwhile to do so in few enough cases that the default position cre
ates more efficiency than it obstructs.
Because Professor Rasmussen's proposal essentially represents a
translation of his general contractual-bankruptcy theories to an inter
national level, a full statement of my objections to it would be a full
blown critique of his theoretical approach, which would take me too
far afield in this article. I will address, however, two objections that
have particular saliency internationally.
All contractual approaches to law rest on the basic argument that,
assuming a perfect market and no transaction costs, parties will always
adopt the most efficient bargain. Therefore, any legal constraint on
that bargain must be irrelevant or inefficient. The constraint is irrele
vant to the extent it permits the bargain to be struck, and inefficient to
the extent it changes the terms of the private bargain. In the debtor
creditor context, this syllogism supports a bankruptcy law that has lit
tle or no content, except to enforce the bargain between the parties.
In very brief summary, two of the key flaws in any contractual ap
proach are lack of asset control (including protection of creditor pri
ority) and the difficulty of disclosure (or "transparency"). These two
flaws are especially important in the international context, so I will
discuss them here. Both of them are correctable only if the contrac
tual-menu is linked to an enforceable security interest, an interest that
is very difficult to obtain internationally.

1.

Asset Control

The first point is that any contractual approach to bankruptcy, in
cluding the menu, has no benefit unless the bargain is enforceable.
The bargain is unlikely to be enforceable, however, unless coupled
with a security interest. That fact leads to one of the most fundamen
tal criticisms of any contractual approach to bankruptcy: that ap
proach represents only a variant on the secured credit device and a
minor one at that. Even Professor Rasmussen's contractual-menu ap
proach, arguably the most plausible of these concepts, is subject to this
critique.124
A debtor-creditor bargain can be highly protected by a dominant
security interest125 coupled with appropriate contractual covenants.

124. As Professor LoPucki puts it, bankrupt debtors "may breach their contracts with
impunity." LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2235. Of course, that is not
true if the contract is supported by a security interest.
125. By a dominant security interest, I mean either a blanket lien over substantially all
the debtor's assets or a security interest in key assets which are difficult to replace, without
which the debtor cannot function effectively, and which give a significant measure of control
over cash flow. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern ofSecured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Secured Credit]. For example, the typical sin
gle-asset real estate case would satisfy criteria one and two, but would satisfy three only
where rents are held to be cash collateral. See, e.g., Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing Con·
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Any bargain protected by such an interest has little to fear from bank
ruptcy.126 The bankruptcy menu can offer little additional advantage
beyond the security interest itself. On the other hand, where a credi
tor lacks sufficient bargaining power to negotiate such a lien,127 any
bankruptcy-menu bargain will be largely unenforceable in the context
of general default, the bankruptcy context.128 The reason is that any
system that does not control the debtor's assets cannot protect the par
ties' bargain against debtor manipulation. It is all too easy for the
debtor to use transfers to subsidiaries and affiliates, among many other
devices, to undo the benefits for which the creditor has bargained.
The legal mechanisms for preventing inappropriate asset transfers notably fraudulent conveyance and preference rules - are clumsy and
operate effectively only after the point of demonstrable insolvency in
the period just prior to a formal bankruptcy.
Without the asset control provided by an effective system of secu
rity-interest enforcement, ex ante efficiencies cannot be obtained by
bargaining over bankruptcy alternatives because the bargains cannot
be enforced.

2.

Disclosure

The second major problem with any contractual approach to bank
ruptcy, domestically and internationally, is the issue of disclosure:

fusion Over Real Property Rents As Cash Collateral In Bankruptcy: The Need for A Consis
tent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1 (1992/1993).
126. Without writing the article here, I note that a creditor who can prevent use of the
debtor's assets to administer the case (including paying the lawyers) can be quite sure of
lifting the automatic stay quickly in almost all cases, rendering the bankruptcy irrelevant
from the creditor's point of view. There may be a handful of cases in which that cannot be
done. One instance is where there is too little at stake to make a lift-stay motion worthwhile.
It is true that in some circumstances in certain systems a bankruptcy petition may pro
duce delay even for a creditor holding a valid security interest. That can happen in the
United States, for example. Even if we had no bankruptcy system at all, such delays might
result from a debtor's preliminary injunction litigation against foreclosure or other devices.
Secured creditors are naive if they can imagine a world in which there are no delays or costs
for such creditors in a general default.
127. To say much the same thing in efficiency language, the costs to a debtor of granting
a security interest may exceed the savings the debtor receives in the form of a lower interest
rate and other favorable terms. The primary reason is that the security interest represents a
substantial transfer of control over the debtor's assets to the creditor, especially if it is a
"dominant security interest." Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125, at 665, 668. The debtor
(or its management) may conclude that the cost in lost business flexibility exceeds any sav
ings the bargain enables the creditor to offer in exchange. This point is central to the on
going debate about security interests, but it can only be mentioned here.
128. I do not mean to suggest that a security interest over some specific asset will have
no value to a creditor in such a circumstance, but only that it will be insufficient to enforce
the overall bankruptcy-menu bargain, because of the debtor's capacity to manipulate all the
uncontrolled assets.
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How will creditors, even adjusting creditors,129 know and understand
the bankruptcy configuration of the entity with whom they are deal
ing?130 Will acquiring that information impose unacceptable transac
tion costs?131 Professor LoPucki has done an excellent analysis of
these and other difficulties that face contractual theories with regard
to disclosure. I will rest on that analysis for the proposition that the
contractual-menu approach creates serious and intractable problems
of transparency. As with asset control, only linkage with a security in
terest in an Article 9 type system of public registration could solve this
problem.

3.

Security as a Solution

One can imagine globalization leading to a system in which default
is administered through a single secured-creditor system.132 Article 9
presents elegant solutions to the problems of priorities vis-a-vis the
rights of third parties and its public-registration system effectively ad
dresses the disclosure issue. If one were to adopt a privatized, contrac
tual system for managing global defaults, Article 9 is the obvious
model with which to begin fashioning such a system, because it solves
the two central problems not solved by mere contractual-bankruptcy
approaches. Importantly, it is a system that has been tested over many
decades in highly successful economies.
Of course, the proposal of such a system would require addressing
the decades-long debate in the United States and elsewhere concern
ing the efficiency and fairness of a secured-credit system,133 especially
one that effectively would pre-empt traditional bankruptcy laws as the
mechanism for managing a general default. Furthermore, because
such a system would be designed to manage general defaults, the tradi
tional job of bankruptcy laws, it would have to be symmetrical with the
global market and therefore would have to be adopted globally.
Yet to solve the problem with a secured-credit system is even more
difficult internationally. A number of efforts have been under way for
some time to try to achieve international agreement with respect to se
cured credit, but all are experiencing serious obstacles. There are a
number of countries that have substantial reservations about granting
unlimited first priority to security interests and there are a number

129. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se
cured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (introducing the term "adjusting
creditor").
130. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2246-47.
131. See id.
132 See supra note 125 for elucidation of a "dominant" security interest.
133. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125.
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that favor priority, but are not prepared to accept the United States
approach to registration and disclosure of security interests.134
The notion of using security interests in a single-creditor or syndi
cated-creditor approach to financing as a solution to the problem of a
general default may be the most plausible alternative to universalism
in the sense I use the term. If a single-creditor system would achieve
our goals, the bankruptcy-menu approach would be unnecessary. If
agreement on the role of security interests (asset control, priority, and
disclosure) cannot be achieved, the bankruptcy-menu approach cannot
be successful either. The point is not merely a question of political dif
ficulty. In my view, the contractual-menu approach has been useful as
an analytic tool,135 but our development of a theoretical model at the
international level will require us to proceed in a different direction.
B.

Professor LoPucki
1.

Generally

Professor LoPucki's Cornell article is, as usual, full of ideas that are
contrarian, surprising, interesting, and useful.136 That article is devoted
in large part to critiquing my position, which is flattering, under the
heading "universalism," which is misleading. The problem is that Pro
fessor LoPucki conflates two perspectives: a theoretical world of in
ternational agreement embodied in an agreed international conven
tion and the current world as it is, semi-globalized and highly
uncoordinated. Professor LoPucki criticizes universalism as if it were
applied in the current world, while comparing it to a coordinated terri
torialism achieved under a global convention in a world ready to come
to such an agreement. The defect in the comparison is like describing
the difficulties of a 747 landing in the wilderness and then comparing
its performance with a DC3 touching down at Heathrow. The fault
may be mine, for having extolled the benefits of the long-term solu
tion, universalism, while focusing my detailed analysis on modified
universalism, a transitional rule. Because universalism has been so
widely accepted in academic circles, I have been guilty of failing to
present it adequately at the theoretical level. I will therefore compare
theoretical, future universalism as I have described it above with Pro-

134. See 1997 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/434, para. 248,
containing the report of the meeting of the Working Group on International Contract Prac
tices of UNCITRAL in November 1996. The current version of the draft Convention pre
pared by the Secretariat is contained in the Convention on Assignment in Receivables Fi
nancing, 1998 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IJ/WP.96. See
also Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing:
UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 315 (1998).
135. I am tempted to say "heuristic," but I promised Mom I would not.
136. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra· note 30.
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fessor LoPucki's theoretical, "conventionalized" territorialism as pre
sented in his widely read article in the Cornell Law Review.131 I will
then compare modified universalism with the current system of terri
torialism. In both comparisons, universalism is the better system.
For clarity, the analysis starts with a single multinational corporate
debtor, postponing the problem of corporate groups until the basics
have been established.
"Cooperative territorialism" as proposed by Professor LoPucki in
his Cornell article is a system in which each country exercises jurisdic
tion over the assets within its de facto power, without regard to legal
concepts of jurisdiction.138 Its courts manage and distribute those as
sets in accordance with the national priority system with complete
freedom to deny priority treatment to "foreign" creditors (however
"foreign" might be defined139).140 Where in a particular case it would
be useful to cooperate - his example is in a joint sale of an asset
package situated in two countries - the national courts would coop
erate. The various avoiding powers would be applied to transfers of
assets that were in the de facto power of a given court at the time of
the transfer to be attacked.141 The court would apply its local avoid
ance law.142
Professor LoPucki's territorial system is made cooperative and co
herent through adoption of a convention, but it retains most of the
disadvantages of any territorial system. Its fundamental flaw is that no
national bankruptcy law is symmetrical with a global market. For the
reasons mentioned earlier, no system of managing a general default
can be effective unless it is symmetrical with the market. For that rea
son, countries have uniformly adopted national bankruptcy laws.
When markets were mostly national, such a law was symmetrical with
most of the market it governed.

137. See id.
138. See id. at 742-55.
139. See infra note 191.
140. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30. Professor LoPucki does not discuss how
he would square this discrimination with the numerous treaties to which the United States is
a party requiring "national treatment" for the citizens of the other treaty party. See, e.g.,
Treaty between the United States and Israel Regarding Friendship, Commerce and Naviga
tion, Apr. 3, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 550; Treaty between the United States and Japan Regarding
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063. I am not clear if he
would permit the courts to subordinate "foreign" creditors to general unsecured local credi
tors, but he would permit foreign creditors to file. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30,
at 753-54; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotia
tions: Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organiza
tion], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
141. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 748-49. .
142 See text accompanying infra notes 184-193.
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A territorial system, being asymmetrical to a global market, has
two serious weaknesses: the consequences of a general default depend
upon the location of assets, and the laws of each jurisdiction differ
greatly.143 International bankruptcy is reduced to a game of musical
chairs in which creditors cannot know in advance where the assets of
the debtor will be located when the music stops. These flaws produce
three bad results: a) distribution results are unpredictable; b) the
debtor, perhaps in collusion with a favored creditor, can engage in
strategic behavior up to and including fraud, by manipulation of asset
location; and c) claims must be made, and administration and litigation
must be conducted, in multiple jurisdictions at far greater cost. By
contrast, in a world with a universalist convention establishing one
bankruptcy law and one court system to administer it, the law would
be highly predictable, movement of assets would be irrelevant, and the
entire process could be administered efficiently. The consequence
would be a great reduction in risk premiums and transaction costs and
a great increase in fairness and efficiency.
To argue for territoriality as the goal of an international system is
much the same as arguing for state-by-state bankruptcy within the
United States. Even if there were a political case to be made for co
operative territoriality as an interim system, such a system as a long
term solution defies logic. For all the reasons discussed earlier, bank
ruptcy is inherently a market-symmetrical system and such a system is
best served by universalism.
Territorialism is even less efficient if we consider only reorganiza
tion. Reorganization requires a high level of cooperation to adminis
ter and rescue a financially distressed multinational company. That is
true whether the ultimate disposition is continuation or sale as a going
concern. It is very difficult to engender the necessary cooperation
among courts, given contending interests. Each court is bound by rela
tively rigid rules governing the details of entitlements under local
bankruptcy law. Professor LoPucki's convention would apparently
ensure that such entitlements were honored in detail.144 For the rea
sons explained by the ALI Principles,145 the result is to make it ex
tremely difficult to achieve a reorganization. It has already been de
scribed how smoothly and efficiently reorganization of a multinational
could be achieved under a single-law, single court universalist system.
Reorganization is modern bankruptcy law. For that reason, it is the
focus of nearly all the reform proposals being made and adopted

143. Nothing in Professor LoPucki's convention speaks to narrowing the differences be
tween priority systems and other rules in each territorial enclave. On the contrary, Professor
LoPucki wants to defend the integrity of each system's policy choices. See LoPucki, Coop
eration, supra note 30, 751.
144. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30.
145. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 19.
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around the world, from Germany to Me:xico.146 Indeed, the flexibility
of reorganization statutes is often utilized today even where the busi
ness is to be liquidated in one sense or another.147 To adopt territori
alism as a long-term solution would be to leave multinational corpora
tions mired in a liquidation-centered bankruptcy system already
obsolete domestically.
The territorialist system also claims as a virtue the protection of the
social policies of each nation through local priority rules and other lo
cal rules.148 My initial discussion of true universalism explained how
national policies could be diverse and yet protected in a universalist
system, just as many state-law policies are enforced routinely in
United States bankruptcy courts.149 It also suggested that the interna
tional bankruptcy system might be limited to large, multinational
companies, leaving local interests to be governed by local bankruptcy
laws and policies. On the other hand, it is true that in a universalist
system some bankruptcy rules would be imposed at the international
level, as they are now imposed in most nations at the national rather
than at the regional level. That result is natural, proper, and inevitable
in a globalizing financial and commercial system that requires an un
derlying uniformity in the event of a multinational general default.
Just as the free flow of goods, services, and investments in the
American Republic required a national bankruptcy law, true global
ization of trade and investment requires an international one. If the
political viewpoints that would be offended by that result prevail in the
end, then globalization will be halted in many other areas as well.
Even in a territorial system, local policies are very difficult to apply
to multinationals, especially in the context of insolvency and general
default. Is a tort victim protected by a territorial system? As things
stand now, no web of laws ensures that a dangerous foreign product
sold in the United States is backed by either insurance or substantial
local assets. Absent local assets, how will a territorial system of bank
ruptcy protect the tort victim? What about the employee priority for
repayment in bankruptcy? Would it be protected in a territorial sys
tem? No law requires a foreign company with an American payroll to
have sufficient funds in the United States to pay employees. Instead,
available funds may be e-transferred out of the country to a distant

146. Chapter 11, like the prophet, is dishonored by its local academics, but the rest of
the world is interested and impressed. See, e.g., Insolvency Bill [H.L.], Session 1999-2000
(2000), at <littp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml99900/cmbills/173/2000
173.htm>; see also, British Review, supra note 14, at 12-13.
147. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994), affd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (adoption of
worldwide plan of liquidation).
148. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 751-52.
149. See supra note 52.
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bank moments before the payroll checks are processed, with no local
assets to cover the employees. In those circumstances, only a univer
salist procedure would have the possibility of protecting the employ
ees.
There is a whole legal industry devoted to helping foreign compa
nies avoid or carefully limit their United States presence. Even "ad
justing" creditors, like the larger suppliers, have no assurance that sub
stantial United States assets stand behind a foreign company's
contractual promise. Because the territorial model of business simply
does not apply to multinational companies, the assumption that local
policies will be less vindicated in a universalist bankruptcy system is
highly problematic with regard to multinationals.150
By contrast, a universalist system, marshalling a company's assets
worldwide, could permit and enforce a limited range of agreed interna
tional priorities. For example, a priority for employees, one found in
most domestic bankruptcy systems, could be agreed internationally
and would be more reliably enforced than the existing territorial pri
orities. This example illustrates once more that globalization requires
converging standards and that universalism is the best method for
promoting convergence and taking advantage of its benefits.
In every respect, then, true universalism is a better long-term goal
than cooperative territorialism, if one assumes continued globaliza
tion. The only basis that would remain for preferring cooperative ter
ritorialism would be the claim that universalism cannot be achieved
politically or would take much longer to achieve. That point is dis
cussed below.

2.

Corporate Groups

In comparing universalism with territorialism at the theoretical
level, one other point made by Professor LoPucki requires attention:
the problem of corporate groups. This problem is also far broader
than bankruptcy. In his classic multivolume treatise, The Law of Cor
porate Groups,151 Phillip Blumberg analyzes in detail the enormous le
gal problems that are presented by business enterprises with a single
direction, but infinitely multipliable legal redoubts. He suggests that
they may have to be treated as single entities under some circum
stances,152 "piercing the corporate veil." It goes without saying that I
cannot seriously address the multitude of issues presented by corpo-

150. See text accompanying infra notes 152-165.
151. PlilLLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS
{1998).
152 See id. at xxxix (recognizing that modem bankruptcy law often disregards the tradi
tional rule of corporate separateness where related corporate entities have engaged in com
plex transactions, then fallen on difficult economic times).
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rate groups within the confines of this Article nor can the bankruptcy
aspects of those issues be easily isolated for analysis. Nonetheless, it is
true that bankruptcy is one of the fields in which the corporate-group
presents a major problem internationally. Indeed, Blumberg devotes
an entire volume to it.
Understandably, Professor LoPucki does not attempt to answer the
larger questions about corporate groups. Nonetheless, to use the gen
eral problem posed by corporate groups as an argument for coopera
tive territorialism, Professor LoPucki must show that territorialism is
better suited to cope with the problem than is universalism. The ALI
Statement of Principles identifies two categories of problems relating
to corporate groups in the context of international bankruptcy.153 The
first is group liability. The second is consolidation or coordination.
The first implicates all the larger issues just mentioned. Although
most countries respect the corporate form most of the time, there are
major exceptions, not limited to the odd tort case involving a taxi
company.154 The oft-cited instances are Deltec155 and Bhopal,156 both
cases in which a parent company was exposed to liability for the obli
gations of its subsidiary.157 Universalism's single court and single law
are transparently better suited to sorting out the liability of various
elements in a worldwide corporate group in such circumstances.
Professor LoPucki's claim that territorialism better manages inter
national corporate groups relates to the second problem, procedural
consolidation and coordination. He assumes a model in which corpo
rate groups are neatly arranged in national slots. Each country where
the group operates has its own local corporation and all of the assets
and liabilities relating to that country are concentrated in that local

153. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 96-97.
154. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that a British parent company actively involved in illegal conduct in the United States was
therefore subject to jurisdiction and, impliedly, liability).
155. C-705-XVI. Compania Swift de La Plata S.A., Frigorifica s/ convocatoria
acreedores. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, 4 Sept. 1973 (Michael
W. Gordon, trans., Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke-Davis and De/tee Cases, 6 LAW.
AMER. 320, 330 (1974)); see also Michael W. Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: De/tee Up
date, 11 LAW. AMER. 43 (1979).
156. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). Bhopal has raised one
law, one-forum questions with respect to tort liability, human rights violations, and criminal
liability. See id. More than 15 years after the tragedy that injured 200,000 Indians these
questions are still being contested. See Chris Hedges, A Key Figure Proves Elusive In a U.S.
Suit Over Bhopal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at A4 (discussing recent events with respect to
criminal proceedings in India and a human rights suit in New York related to the disaster).
157. See Claudia M. Pardinas, The Enigma of the Legal Liability of Transnational Cor
porations, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 405 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Bhopal
Symposium: Theories of Parent Company Liability and The Prospects for An International
Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1985); Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Note, Parens Patriae and the
Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181 (1988).
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corporation.158 The company then files a local bankruptcy and the lo
cal court administers the local assets for the benefit of the local credi
tors under the local law, perhaps with some measure of practical coop
eration with the courts in other countries. Having constructed a
perfectly territorial model, he makes a reasonable argument that a ter
ritorial legal regime best suits it. Here my dispute with him is primar
ily empirical. Although there are few data,159 my sense is that the
model is so far from the reality as to offer little support for the territo
rial view.
In fact, many companies operate directly, rather than
through subsidiaries, in countries outside of their country of incorpo
ration or principal place of business. It is also common to establish a
subsidiary in one country that serves regional purposes and has assets
and liabilities all over a region. Even where first or second tier sub
sidiaries are established in each country of operation, it is often the
case that the assets and operations are not maintained territorially, but
are scattered around the corporate family, globally or regionally.160
The companies in the corporate group regularly transfer assets among
themselves for business and tax reasons as part of global cash man
agement programs and in the course of inter-group politics. They also
exchange cross-guarantees to third parties for the obligations of the
parent and affiliates. Then there is fraud: moving assets across bor
ders precisely to confuse and obfuscate. In short, the reality for most
multinationals is a complicated mass of assets and liabilities sprawled
across borders, not a neat territorial division. The corporate-group
problem greatly complicates international bankruptcy issues. It does
not make them territorial.
Take, for example, a multinational case in which some assets are in
Mexico. The territorialist claim would be that the Mexican courts can
simply dispose of the Mexican assets.161 Such a claim assumes a simple
territorial reality that is counterfactual. If the standard for determin
ing that an asset is Mexican is a legal one, like "jurisdiction," then
there will be many potential conflicts of jurisdictional decisions in a
territorial system. If the standard is raw power to control assets, there
will be equal room for conflict, with even more serious consequences.

158. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 751.
159. Here a marvelous empirical project awaits a young law or finance professor, in
volving a good deal of travel, much of it to sun-drenched islands. Pending that study, I prof
fer in support of my view of the facts, for what it is worth, eleven years in international prac
tice. I was a partner in a firm called Surrey & Morse (now part of Jones, Day, Reavis, and
Pogue) and my practice was largely devoted to litigation and transactions involving multina
tionals around the world.
160. Because these subsidiaries often have no business reality, it is hard to get business
people to make reality congruent with the legal fiction. Exemplary of the point in text is the
Maxwell situation. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons o/Maxwell Communications,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Lessons].
161. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2234.
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Suppose a bank account in the New York branch of a London bank
held in the name of a Mexican corporation. The traditional, fictional
choice-of-law rule would choose New York law as goveming,162 but
there is a substantial argument that the worldwide bank has the ulti
mate obligation to pay.163 Thus the New York and English courts
would have quite plausible claims to jurisdiction over the account on
those grounds, while the Mexican bankruptcy court would be follow
ing another established doctrine by asserting jurisdiction over the ac
count by virtue of a worldwide in rem jurisdiction over all of its
debtor's property. As to power, both New York and London would
have contempt power over the bank, while Mexico could order the
debtor's officers to comply under pain of contempt.164 Which court
can "claim" the bank account under a territorial system? All three can
do so. The bank and the debtor may well be subject to conflicting or
ders. Many other examples are available in a globalizing world in
which attempts to assign assets, liabilities, and operations to particular
territories are increasingly futile in every case that matters.
There can be little doubt that the problem of the legal responsibil
ity of corporate groups will be addressed as the world continues to
globalize. The general pressures for convergence already discussed
will operate here as well. The operations of multinationals create
grave policy problems for nation states and a serious legal problem for
every person in a nation state who relies upon a territorial legal re
gime. For a tort victim or a small supplier, the risk of inefficiency and
injustice because of an injury by one soldier in a multinational corpo
rate army is substantial. The territorial system offers little defense.
Even for contract creditors, the difficulty of identifying clearly the
corporate actor with whom one is contracting, much less the laws that
might apply to that actor's conduct, make such contracting expensive
(because of the cost of information acquisition and the need for multi
ple solutions to bargaining issues) and the results unpredictable.
These problems will continue to haunt all areas of commercial and
business life in a globalizing world, from securities regulation to anti
trust to bankruptcy. Territorialism is less able to cope with them pre
cisely because it turns upon a territorial model of economic conduct
that is outdated on its way to obsolete. On the other hand, the steady

162 See REsTATEMENT {FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 416, 369 (1934) (reflecting
territorial view that the law of the place of payment governs liability for non-payment of ob
ligations); Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1927) (stating that the liability of
a bank for an obligation is governed by the law of the place where payment on the obligation
was to be made, in this case Austria-Hungary).
163. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990) (recognizing
the possibility that the debt of a Philippine branch could be recovered from the general as
sets of a New York bank).
164. I use the term "contempt" to embrace any judicial remedy for violation of court
orders.
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pressure for universalist solutions in all these commercial fields will in
teract with those in bankruptcy to evolve efficient answers.165

3.

Lesser Universalism

Because a truly universalist system may be many years away, it is
appropriate to touch briefly upon lesser versions of universalism that
would represent a substantial improvement on the ad hoc system of
modified universalism or any form of territorialism.

a. Single Court, National Laws. The point was made earlier that a
lesser form of universalism could be achieved by a single court system
applying national bankruptcy laws. I will call such a system a "single
court" universalism. The single court would choose a single national
bankruptcy law to apply in each case. It would choose the law to apply
pursuant to an internationally agreed choice-of-law rule. This system
would not be as good as true universalism. There would be a lower
level of predictability because the single court would not have a single
international bankruptcy law to apply. The choice-of-law decisions
would multiply and grow greatly in complexity.166 It would still be true
that a single court system applying only two sets of choice-of-law rules
(one for bankruptcy law and one for nonbankruptcy law) would, over
time, produce results far more predictable than those obtainable in
multiple tribunals.
Nonetheless, this point is one that greatly concerns Professor
LoPucki, because of his conviction that the proper choice-of-law rule
would be difficult to establish and enforce and would be subject to
strategic manipulation.167 The reason is that he believes it is impossi
ble to state a workable conflicts rule designating the bankruptcy law of
a company's home country as controlling. He believes one cannot use
the company's state of incorporation because it is too subject to ma
nipulation nor its principle place of business, because it is too hard to
determine. Although he does not address this problem in the context

165. This Article would grow much bigger if these issues were discussed. For example,
one could easily envision a system in which every corporate group, as defined, would be re
quired to register ( incorporate) in a country that it can demonstrate is an important center of
its activities and to disclose that registration in its stationery, invoices, advertising, web sites,
emails, and other business co=unications. Then an international rule or a choice-of-law
rule could be tied to that location. Many other solutions are available as well, each with its
own difficulties.
166. As with our current nonsystem internationally, the combination of choice-of
bankruptcy law and choice-of-nonbankruptcy law interacting as to each dispute multiplies
the plausible alternative outcomes.
167. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 720, 729. Actually, Professor LoPucki
focuses upon the problem in the context of the choice-of-forum issue, but the questions are
much the same.
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of a global convention specifying the relevant standard, it seems clear
he does not believe that a workable standard can be articulated.168
I agree that the law of the place of incorporation is unsatisfactory
because of the risk of sham incorporation - a company organized un
der a flag of convenience unrelated to the location of its business,
management, and assets. Professor LoPucki, however, is also not sat
isfied with a "principal place of business" or "center of main interests"
standard. He argues that such a standard is hopelessly imprecise and
will lead to much litigation and inconsistent decisions. Yet the princi
pal place of business standard in one formulation or another is com
monplace throughout American law - state and federal169 - and is
found elsewhere as well.170 That sort of standard has produced some
litigation, but I am unaware of any widely held view that it is so impre
cise as to be impractical or to maim any important legal objective. The
center-of-main-interests standard was adopted in the EU Conven
tion171 and the Model Law,172 with no substantial claim asserted that
the standard was too difficult to enforce. A similar standard has been
applied by the United States courts in applying section 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code in the choice of forum context without provoking
substantial litigation.173 It is unclear why great difficulty should be an
ticipated for it in the context of a bankruptcy convention, especially if
it is applied by a single court system around the world.

168. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 718.
169. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(l) (1994) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its princi
pal place of business."). This standard has given rise to a certain amount of controversy, but
has remained in place because it is reasonably workable. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus
For The American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 855, 882-84 (1998) (discussing the controversy regarding interpretation of this clause at
the federal level, but concluding that sufficient consensus has been reached among courts to
prevent raising the issue in the ALI revision). Consider also the "chief executive office"
standard in § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1994); 8
Hawkland U.C.C. Series (West Group) § 9-103:9 (1997) (collecting cases that discuss the
"chief executive office" standard).
170. See, e.g., Canadian Statement, supra note 7, at 118 (explaining that Canadian law
applies a chief place of business standard to choose the law applicable to security interests in
mobile goods and intangibles); Kamlah, supra note 4 (explaining that the new German bank
ruptcy code utilizes a center of main interests standard).
171. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer
cial Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 32, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
172. MODELLAW, supra note 16, at IV.31.
173. Section 304 permits deference to a "foreign proceeding." Section 101 of the Bank
ruptcy Code defines such a proceeding: " 'foreign proceeding' means proceeding, whether
judicial or administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in
which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were
located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate,
adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization." 11
u.s.c. § 101(23) (1994).
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Furthermore, it is not necessary to assume a raw, unsophisticated
choice between place of incorp9ration anc;l principal place of business
in choosing a choice-of-law rule for an international convention in a
globalizing world. For one thing, the choice may be multidimensional.
The Model Law provides that the place of incorporation is presumed
to be the center of the debtor's main interests.174 It would be a short
step to make that presumption rebuttable only by a clear showing that
the center was elsewhere. A naked incorporation in a sun-drenched
bank haven would fall easily before proof of the actual center of the
business, while a multiply-centered business incorporated under the
law of any of its centers would be easily "centered" for bankruptcy
purposes. Any law professor can then devise the marginal hypotheti
cal where the plant is in Chicago, while the CEO, one secretary, and a
fax machine actually reside on the sun-drenched isle, but the marginal
cases will be few. Resolved in a single court, they would present little
practical difficulty across the run of cases. The specification of court
jurisdiction in the highly successful Brussels Convention serves as an
excellent early model for this sort of international rulemaking in the
context of a single-court, referred-question system.175 The model
would work as well for choice of law, even though it is somewhat more
complicated than choice of forum.

b. Single Law, National Courts. Another lesser form of univer
salism might consist of a single international bankruptcy law enforced
by national courts, which I will call a "single law" system. Such a sys
tem would be the mirror-image of the single-court system. The rule
for selecting the primary court to administer a general default, with
other courts serving in an ancillary role, would likely be one of the
variants just discussed. For the same reasons, there should not be
great difficulty in identifying the proper court to play the primary role.
174. See Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insol
vencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 13 AM BANKR. L.J. 385,
419 (1999) ("According to the UNCITRAL Cross-Border Insolvency Model Law Article
16(3), the center of the debtor's main interest is presUilled to be the debtor's registered of
fice . . . . ).
.

"

175. See Brussels Convention, supra note 171. For a general discussion of the conven
tion today, see Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition ofJudgments in the European Commu
nity: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 559
(1993); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing PersonalJurisdiction in the United States and
the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM J. COMP. L. 121, 138-43
(1992) (criticizing some aspects of the Brussels Convention, but still offering it as a model
preferable to American constitutionalizing of jurisdiction); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Un
fit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1039 (1995) (although criticizing the
Brussels Convention's treatment of non-signatories, agreeing that it's approach to personal
jurisdiction issues could be an effective model for shaping U.S. law); Russell J. Weintraub,
How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We
Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 167-68 (1998) (suggesting that the
Brussels Convention offers an excellent model on which to base negotiations for a new
judgments convention).
.
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If a single international bankruptcy law were administered by multiple
national tribunals, many of the benefits described above would be re
duced or eliminated, but the results would nonetheless be more uni
form, more predictable, more efficient, and more fair than would be
possible using national bankruptcy laws.
In either system of lesser universalism, the manager of a reorgan
izing business (corporate management or an appointed trustee)176
would have one court to supervise the worldwide restructuring of the
business. That result alone would make even these lesser forms of
universalism superior to territorialism, where reorganization efforts on
a transnational basis would remain difficult or impossible, as explained
above.

c. Multiple Law and Courts. The final alternative would be a
multilaw, multicourt convention that had only a choice-of-law rule and
a choice-of-court rule. That system would be better than we have
now, because the governing rules would be adopted at the interna
tional level and binding on all the contracting parties, but it would be
far short of true universalism. It is difficult to say if it should be con
sidered as the lowest form of universalism or the highest form of the
transitional solution, modified universalism.
d. Bankruptcy as Part of a Converging and Internationalizing Legal
World. These systems regulating international bankruptcy will not
evolve in a vacuum. As the EU example demonstrates, a globalizing
world will generate increasing pressures for predictable international
rules in a number of areas relating to commerce. Transnational busi
ness will demand to be regulated (or deregulated) at an international
level.177 Although many areas will remain governed by national laws,
some level of predictability, or even uniformity, will be required to ac
commodate the growing globalization of business enterprise. That ac
commodation can be achieved in three ways: sufficient convergence of
national laws (as in the uniform-law movement within the United
States), adoption of an international substantive rule, or adoption of
an international choice-of-law, choice-of-forum rule. Specific solu
tions may combine these approaches, achieving a "one-law, one
forum" solution.178
Universalist bankruptcy will be one important example, but only
one, of a one-law, one-forum solution. Securities regulation, antitrust

176. In the United States and a number of other countries, the debtor remains in posses
sion in a reorganization. See IMF Report, supra note 2, at 57-58. In many other countries,
the creditors or a court appoint a trustee to take over the management of a reorganizing
company. See id.
177. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts ofLaws, and the Regula·
tion of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 71 {1990).
178. Ultintately, the point is achieving an international regime for business, whether
than regime is substantively regulatory or deregulatory. See id.
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enforcement, and environmental laws are already farther along in
some respects than bankruptcy. The EU example suggests that bank
ruptcy will be more difficult than most others and slower in coming.
For the reasons indicated above, the convergence approach alone can
not work efficiently for the collective device that is bankruptcy be
cause of the need for market symmetry. The result must be the slow
process of evolution of an international regime or an international rule
that chooses predictably the applicable local regime. A combination
of the two - the former applied to as-defined large multinationals and
the latter for local enterprises - is a definite possibility. Also quite
possible is a combination of international and national solutions in a
single-court or a single-law system, as has just been described.
For present purposes, the point is that in a globalizing world there
will be many occasions other than bankruptcy to deal with issues like
sham incorporation and multiple business centers. Tax issues, labor
regulations, trade preferences, and a host of other questions will re
quire either an international legal regime or rules "centering" a busi
ness for legal purposes or both. It is more than likely that these con
verging requirements will solve, or set up for solution, the one-law,
one-forum problem for bankruptcy as well.179

4.

Transitional Rules

Having done me the favor of forcing me to articulate the argu
ments for universalism as the proper theoretical and long-term solu
tion, Professor LoPucki has granted me the further courtesy in this
symposium of conceding that I am right.180 He is prepared to narrow
the argument to the best system for transition. I am convinced that
modified universalism is the best transitional rule, because it moves us
in the right direction - toward true universalism - and provides the
essential experience to inform the fashioning of a multinational bank
ruptcy convention when that time comes. It also permits flexible,
pragmatic decisions to be made in the here and now that enable par
ties to obtain some portion of the benefits of universalism.
A transitional rule must satisfy two requirements. Like all rules, it
should produce the fairest and most efficient results possible. In addi
tion, it should assist, rather than retard, the transition to the long-term
rule that will produce the best results. To the extent that the two ob
jectives conflict, we should aim for a sensible balance.
We start with the issue of the best rule for current results, the heart
of Professor LoPucki's argument. Realizing that cooperation is essen-

179. See supra text accompanying note 165.
180. Such a concession marks the mature and secure scholar. However, Professor
LoPucki insists it will be "decades if not centuries" before universalism can be installed, a
view I regard as far too pessimistic. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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tial to the fairest and most efficient results, Professor LoPucki argues
for a "cooperative" territorialism, which is not quite an oxymoron, at
least as a transitional rule. The difficulty is that Professor LoPucki's
proposal simply exchanges one set of legal problems for another, while
making cooperation much less likely. As noted above,181 assets and
operations do not fall neatly into territorial boxes. Under Professor
LoPucki's approach, each national forum must decide which assets are
part of its jurisdiction, but it will routinely be the case that more than
one forum can fairly claim jurisdiction as to various assets. He has ex
changed one difficult choice-of-forum problem for many such prob
lems. Attempts to cooperate in the face of these conflicting claims will
be very difficult.
That difficulty will be increased by Professor
LoPucki's insistence on "protection" of every arguable right of a local
creditor (however "local creditor" may be defined in a globalizing
world).182
He has seriously complicated the choice-of-law problem in the bar
gain, because a territorial system requires that many courts decide
what law applies to various assets and transactions rather than having
most, if not all, of those decisions concentrated in the main proceed
ing. Thus we could look forward to six countries claiming the right to
apply preference law to one pre-bankruptcy payment, with three de
ciding it was preferential and recoverable and three deciding it was
not. That result creates large inefficiencies, ex ante and ex post.
Modified universalism offers a substantial chance of avoiding such re
sults, because it will often result in a single court resolving such issues.
Cooperative territorialism does not. Indeed, cooperative territorialism
not only risks multiple and inconsistent jurisdictional and choice-of
law decisions, but it is necessarily tied to hopelessly obsolete territorial
choice-of-law rules.183
The Maxwell case illustrates these points, because it involved the
principal problem Professor LoPucki invokes against modified univer-

181. See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
182. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 38.
183. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice Of Law That Focuses
On Consequences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701, 702 (1993); Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Con
flicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080 (1981); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice·of
Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudi·
cation versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958); Willis L.M.
Reese, Conflict of Law and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEt>fP. PROBS. 679, 67980 (1963) (all criticizing the territorial/vested rights approach to choice of law and expressing
the view that its time had passed). But cf. Joanna Benjamin, Property Rights in the Financial
Markets, the Internet and Conflicts ofLaws - The Idea of Location, Schmitthoff Conference
2000: Law and Trade in the 21st century (London, June 1-3, 2000) (abstract; copy on file
with author) ("In the global weightless economy, the fiction of location serves to simplify the
conceptual aspects of conflict of laws."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens ofEqual and Ter
ritorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249
(1992) (arguing for territorial choice-of-law rules within the United States).
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salism - the difficulty of identifying a debtor's principal place of busi
ness - as well as the problems his solution exacerbates. In Maxwell,
the legal saga began when Mr. Maxwell fell or was pushed off his yacht
in Spanish waters. His troubled empire fell apart in scandal and fraud.
One of his groups of companies filed for Chapter 11 in the United
States . and for insolvency administration in the United Kingdom, the
filings within days of each other. The case was the classroom example
for Professor LoPucki's concern: the parent's headquarters were in
London and most of its financing was there, but most of its assets were
in other countries. Specifically, eighty percent of its assets were in
companies headquartered in the United States.184 Thus one could
make a nice argument for either the United States or the United
Kingdom as the country of the main proceeding for the parent. Be
cause of these ambiguities at the start, the United States court forged a
compromise: it refused to dismiss the United States case under section
304, but de facto deferred to British administration of the case, subject
to concurrence on key decisions by an examiner appointed to watch
out for United States interests. This result was a classic application of
modified universalism, because the administration was centralized in
the United Kingdom for the most part, but the United States examiner
was in a position to ensure that United States interests were not com
promised.
Maxwell also presented a classic transnational preference problem,
which the bankruptcy and district courts resolved essentially by defer
ring to British law and the British courts on a finding that the United
Kingdom was the center of the case.185 Although the analysis is much
more complicated in detail,186 that result was squarely consistent with
the pragmatic, yet centralizing instinct of modified universalism.
The final result in Maxwell was an agreed plan of liquidation on a
worldwide basis, apparently the first ever.187 The key point is that the
courts and the parties were able to take a worldwide view of the case,
rather than a parochial one. The fact that United States creditors
would have gotten considerably more money had United States law
been applied to the preference issue did not deter the United States
courts from choosing the cooperative result. Had the courts applied
the "vested rights" views suggested by cooperative territorialism, the
United States creditors in that case would have done better, but
United States creditors in the next "n" cases might well have done

184. It must be noted, however, that these companies - including Random House and
the Official Airline Guide - in turn had assets all over the world.
185. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd 186 B.R. 807, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
186. See Westbrook, Lessons, supra note 160.
187. See id.
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worse because of an inability to achieve a fair and acceptable world
wide result.
Professor LoPucki might claim Maxwell as a good example for his
approach, because two parallel proceedings were involved, rather than
a United States section 304 case ancillary to the British case. Yet
modified universalism can operate through parallel proceedings and
that is what happened in Maxwell.188 The reason Maxwell must be
seen as an application of modified universalism rather than coopera
tive territorialism is that the rights of the parties were seen from a
worldwide perspective, rather than as a series of rights vested in each
territory. Indeed, Professor LoPucki's notion that local creditors are
somehow cheated of vested rights by a transnational solution to a
transnational bankruptcy189 lies at the heart of our disagreement.190
The payments challenged as preferential in Maxwell amounted to
more than $100 million. Their recovery would thus have increased dis
tributions to all unsecured creditors by a substantial percentage. Fur
thermore, if the transferee banks (all of which had substantial opera
tions in the United States ) had suffered a preference judgment in a
purely United States proceeding, the United States creditors would
have done better still.191 Although application of British law would not
have been impossible had Maxwell been governed by a system of co
operative territorialism, it seems likely that there would have been an
overwhelming inclination to apply United States law in a United
States proceeding governed by a notion of fixed local rights. Instead,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in that case largely ig
nored choice-of-law approaches. It affirmed the lower courts primar
ily to vindicate international cooperation in a case they found to be
mainly British.192 It seems probable the court would have come to the

188. An ancillary, deferential approach is better in a system of modified universalism,
but not essential. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 15.
189. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2217-18 ("injustice to the
individual creditors [when a court] surrenders . . . assets") and at 2238 ("change in entitle
ments"); LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 711-13.
190. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 35 {General Principle V).
191. Note, however, that the text is written as if one could meaningfully speak of "a
United States creditor" \vithout an armload of caveats. In fact, most countries, including the
United States, permit foreigners to file claims and receive distributions witllout discrimina
tion. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 34 n.46; Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 16, at 30. The result is tllat "local" benefits may flow to the more sophisticated multina
tional creditors at least as much, if not more, as to stereotypical local creditors. The compli
cations are endless and make the notion of "local" creditors with vested rights even more
attenuated. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 38; Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 16, at 459-50.
192 In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1996).
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opposite conclusion under a legal regime focused on territorialism and
maximizing returns to local creditors.193
Professor LoPucki's discussion of the experience under section 304
of the United States Bankruptcy Code illustrates our disagreement.
Modified universalism is a concept based on section 304 and the cases
thereunder. Section 304 was primarily the brainchild of that excellent
scholar and comparativist, Professor Stefan Riesenfeld.194 It was de
signed to permit United States courts to act in an ancillary role to a
foreign court when that court was in the home country of the debtor,
the site of the "main" bankruptcy proceeding involving that debtor.195
Professor LoPucki's description of the litigation under section 304
turns the jurisprudence on its head. To a lesser extent, the same thing
is true of Professor Guzman.196 They emphasize a handful of cases in
which the United States courts have refused to defer to foreign bank
ruptcy proceedings in the debtor's home country and largely ignore
the many cases in which the United States courts have eagerly and en
thusiastically cooperated with those courts, acting in a truly ancillary
role.197

In

the great majority of cases, the United States courts have

193. Professor LoPucki, in his Cornell article, would solve the Maxwell case another way
by claiming that payments that could be traced to U.S. companies would be voided on a
fraudulent conveyance theory and then, under his proposed treaty, the British courts would
transfer those assets from the British bankruptcy estate to the United States estate. See
LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 715-18. There simply is not room in the current dis
cussion for a full analysis of this suggestion, but it should be noted that the payments in
Maxwell came primarily from the sale of United States companies, not from the accounts of
United States companies as such and, in any case, those companies were apparently solvent,
so it is not clear how fraudulent conveyance law would apply. There are a number of other
difficulties with the suggested approach that could be part of an interesting exchange on that
subject alone.
194.

See Riesenfeld, supra note 32.

195.

See id.

196. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2185; LoPucki,
71, at 2121.

Cooperative Territoriality, supra note

197. See, e.g., Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. New Cap Reinsurance Corp., 244 B.R. 209
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Thornhill Global Deposit Fund, Ltd., 245 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2000); Order Appointing Examiner, In re Maxwell Communication Corp., No. 91 B 15741
(TLB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (BroZinan, J.); Order Confirming Plan, In re Maxwell
Communication Corp., No. 91-15741 (TLB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) reviewed in In re
Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing cooperation in Maxwell Commun
ications Case); In re Axona lnt'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (avoiding transfers to United States creditors and
returning proceeds to Hong Kong primary proceeding for distribution); In re Ocana, 151
B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re
Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Haarhuis v. Kunnan Enter., Ltd., 223 B.R.
252 (D.D.C. 1998); In re Kingscroft Ins. Co., 138 B.R. 121 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); In re
Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Singer, 205 B.R. 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Rukavina, 227
B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Fracmaster, 237 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Texas 1999);
In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Manning, 236 B.R. 14 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1999); In re Treco, 229 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); In re Bird, 222 B.R. 229, 229 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re lonica, PLC, 241
B.R. 829, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). Cf In re YMB Magnex Int'l, Inc., 249 B.R. 402
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steadfastly refused to apply section 304(c) in a narrow and technical
way, as Professor LoPucki reads it, but have given it a broad and gen
erous construction.198 For the most part, the cases in which they have
not deferred to a foreign "main" proceeding have been where they
felt, rightly or wrongly, that the foreign proceeding was fundamentally
unfair.
For example, in the Interpool and Papeleras Reunidas cases, dis
cussed by Professor LoPucki,199 the United States courts found that the
foreign laws were inadequate and unfair, respectively.200 Modified
universalism is "modified" precisely because it permits local courts to
evaluate foreign law and foreign courts before deferring to a main
proceeding. In these two cases, the United States courts were very
likely wrong,201 but their inquiry was legitimate. On the other hand,
United States courts have more often found foreign law to be ade
quate and fair and have deferred.202
By contrast, the court in Toga,203 a widely criticized decision,204 ap
plied the restrictions of section 304(c) quite literally: if a United States
creditor would be disadvantaged, then we go it alone territorially.
That is presumably the result endorsed by Professor LoPucki.205 Ob
viously, that understanding of section 304 would be squarely contrary
to its intent to promote international cooperation, because it would
leave only two possibilities: the case in which the United States credi
tors all feel they will be better off abroad, in which case no United
States proceeding is needed or will be brought, or the case in which
the United States creditors can realize some advantage through a pa
rochial treatment in the United States courts and are absolutely enti
tled to it. To put it another way, to understand section 304 as saying
we only cooperate when it is in our interest to do so (or worse, in the
interest of every one of "our" creditors)206 is to say we will cooperate
rarely. Happily, most United States cases have held to the contrary,
finding that section 304(c) requires only that the foreign law be of the

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (following earlier deferral to Canadian receivership, the court follows
Canadian court in permitting securities litigation to proceed in another court).
198. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 54, at 57, 69; Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37,
at 471-73.
199. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 709-10, 730.
200. I discuss these cases in detail in Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 471-78.
201. See id.
202 See supra note 197.
203. In re Toga Manufacturing, 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
204. See Jn re Ironica PLC, 241 F.R. 829, 838 {Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (collecting authori
ties critical of the Toga case); see also Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 471-73.
205. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 730.
206. See supra note 191.
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same sort generally as ours and adequate to the task of managing
fairly the consequences of the financial distress of the debtor at hand.
They have generally deferred to a foreign main proceeding, even dis
missing United States cases that might conflict with a worldwide ad
ministration,207 except where they had serious doubts about the fair
ness of the foreign proceeding.208 That description of the section 304
litigation is consistent with what I have called modified universalism.
The cases that are discussed by Professors LoPucki and Guzman are
the exceptions, not the exemplars.
Not only is modified universalism a better rule here and now, but it
will be more helpful in the necessary transition to true universalism. It
seems self-evident that judges who have been engaged in active coop
eration in every case as required by modified universalism, and who
have had to evaluate foreign bankruptcy laws in order to determine
whether to defer to a main proceeding, will develop the precise expe
rience necessary to inform the crafters of a universalist convention.
Territorialist judges will cooperate less and conflict with one another
more, reducing their cooperative experience and their interest in co
operative solutions. Policymakers cannot be expected to move the
world in one leap from a highly territorial system to a universal one.
A gradual development of cooperative experience, agreed protocols,209
shared distributions,210 and the like will provide the necessary confi
dence, and knowledge, to permit a universalist regime to be estab
lished.
Professor LoPucki's Cornell article has made a real contribution to
the field by articulating a series of important and interesting questions.
At the end of the day, however, universalism is the right answer and
modified universalism is the right bridge from here to there.211

207. See In re Axona Int. Credit & Co=erce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y.
1988), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (avoiding transfers to United States creditors and
returning proceeds to Hong Kong primary proceeding for distribution).

208. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 143, Reporter's Note 68 (U.S. courts deferring
to Canadian and Mexican courts). Other NAFTA courts have returned the favor. See id.
209. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at Appendix 3 (exemplary protocols).
210. See Westbrook, Lessons, supra note 186, at 2535.
211. Nonetheless, two interesting student notes dismiss the progress so far as hopelessly
inadequate and demand more far-reaching solutions, although in more or less opposite direc
tions. Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense ofPure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insol
vencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 787 (2000) (arguing that the answer is pure univer
salism); Lore Unt, Note, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation:
Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
1037 (1997) (arguing that the answer is cooperation among decentralized courts in liberal
states). Unt's writing preceded LoPucki's defense of territorialism, but it would seem she
would reject it because it is strongly oriented to national states, an orientation she would
likely regard as regressive.
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Professor Guzman

Professor Guzman is a thorough-going universalist who is not
committed to a contractual solution to the international bankruptcy
problem, so I begin by agreeing with many of the points he makes.
His article is devoted to efficiency arguments that turn on the reduc
tion of costs as a function of predictability of result.212 I largely agree
with those arguments, but I must disagree with him in two respects:
these arguments are not new to the literature and they have probably
been overstated.
I first made the argument that universalism would produce lower
borrowing costs through greater predictability in 1990.213 In an article
published in 1991, I asserted "that the increased predictability of the
results of default [from universalism] would significantly reduce the
costs of borrowing and other credit for multinationals."214 Others had
made the argument before me.215 Yet I fear that the efficiency argu
ment may be overstated. On reflection, I think we have to be cautious
in claiming too much by way of increased efficiency and decreased
transaction costs arising from predictability. For one thing, predict
ability in the legal and operational confusion of general default will
always be limited.216 For another, unsecured creditors receive so little
in bankruptcy that even adjusting creditors are unlikely to tailor their
bargains in material respects because of bankruptcy recoveries.217
Data218 and expert reports219 combine to suggest that unsecured credi
tors recover little in liquidations in the United States or anywhere else
in the world. Therefore, one has to be modest in claiming that the
bargains made by such creditors would be much affected by variations
in bankruptcy recoveries.220

212 See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2181.
213. My 1990 lecture was published as GLOBAL INSOLVENCIES IN A WORLD OF NATION
STATES, CURRENT ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY LAW (1991).
214. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 466.
215. See Nadelmann, Local Priorities, supra note 41.
216. See text accompanying supra note 48.
217. See Ronald Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation ofSecured Debt, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 159, 241-43 (1997).
218. See Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond,
Virginia: The Distribution ofAssets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 19841987, 22 RICH. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988).
219. See Roy Goode et al., Debtor-Creditor Regimes, in WORLD BANK, BUILDING
EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 1, 2-3 (1999).
220. That is one reason that I am not convinced that the ex ante view of bankruptcy is
the only important one, as Professor Guzman asserts. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2186
n.43. Another is the fact, recently demonstrated again in East Asia, that creditors, even so
phisticated creditors like the leading money-center commercial and investment banks, regu
larly make serious errors in risk assessment.
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Nonetheless, there may be identifiable groups of debtors unlikely
to grant security. In their general defaults, unsecured creditors might
do better. One of those groups might be multinational companies.
Although more empirical study needs to be done, there is some reason
to think that companies are less likely to grant security as they grow
larger and more successful.221 The explanation would be that compa
nies prefer not to submit to the control entailed in granting security
and therefore resist granting it.222 Multinational companies may be
larger than most. Therefore, empirical investigation may reveal that
bargains with multinationals are not as likely to be secured, rendering
recoveries by the unsecured creditors of multinationals more likely.
The possibility that multinationals might be less likely to grant security
may be enhanced by the difficulty of getting valid and enforceable se
curity interests internationally, making it arguably less likely that mul
tinational debtors and their creditors would find it worthwhile to bar
gain for such security.

If there is a subgroup of firms that are multinational and that do
not grant security to creditors, international bankruptcy arrangements
might materially affect the bargains they strike with their unsecured
creditors, because those creditors might anticipate material differences
in recoveries in a general default under various possible bankruptcy
regimes. If so, then international bankruptcy rules might have mate
rial ex ante effects on the bargains struck by unsecured creditors of
multinational debtors.
Although contractual-bankruptcy arrange
ments could not effectively be enforced,223 a universalist bankruptcy
regime that would predictably protect creditors might make possible
more efficient bargains and better risk-pricing. For example, such a
regime might provide protection against distressed grants of security
to secure previously unsecured debts.
In any case, Professor Guzman's interest is primarily in weakly
adjusting and non-adjusting creditors.224 Truly involuntary creditors225
221. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125; see also Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W.
Smith, Jr., The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities, 50 J. FIN. 899 (1995). There may
be some evidence on this point forthcoming from the Business Bankruptcy Project. See gen
erally Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999).
222. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125, at 664-68. The argument is a complex
one, depending upon the cost to a debtor of losing control of assets as compared with any
lowering of the cost of borrowing consequent upon the grant of security. See id.; see also
Henry Hassmann & Reinier Krakaman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture
Capital Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628 (1992).
223. See supra Section III.Al.
224. Professors Bebchuk and Guzman have also argued that territorialism is actually
better for countries adopting it, providing incentives for local investment by debtors through
lower borrowing costs offered by favored local creditors. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew
T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775
(1999). Although this Article is not the occasion to address that contention, I should note
that I disagree with it. One objection is that their analysis turns on discrimination against
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are not well-protected under domestic law in most countries and are
not likely to do well under either territorialism or universalism until
substantive reforms are made. All adjusting creditors, full to weak,
will do better under universalism, as Professor Guzman says, although
not as well as he and I might like, for the reasons just mentioned. Pre
dictability will reduce risks and costs ex ante to some extent and that
effect is useful. There are details that would be interesting to pursue,
but this article is too long already.

IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important result of this symposium is that we are
all found to favor universalism as the long-term solution to general de
fault by a multinational. Professor Guzman and I seem fairly close to
gether in looking to a form of universalism as a transitional solution as
well. Professor Rasmussen's concept of universalism remains focused
on privatization. He seems not to find much value in transitional solu
tions short of that. Professor LoPucki remains committed in the near
term to territorialism mitigated by agreements to cooperate.
Universalism is the future of international bankruptcy, and the fu
ture may come sooner than we imagine. No one knows if globalization
will continue at its current, accelerating pace, but we do know that in
other fields there are meaningful international legal rules in place to
day that seemed far-distant ten years ago and would have been almost
unimaginable ten years before that. If globalization does proceed
apace, then the pressures for a universal system for managing the fi
nancial crises of multinational companies will prove irresistible: global
bankruptcy for a global market.

foreign creditors. In fact, there is little formal discrimination against foreign creditors in the
great majority of countries. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 34 n.46. It seems unlikely
that informal discrimination would be consistent enough to affect investment patterns mate
rially in countries with reasonably reliable judicial systems. (Countries without such systems
must, of course, be evaluated by investors on an entirely different scale.) Any effect would
therefore be small. For a different analysis of incentives for territorialism arising in countries
that believe they can predict that they will be "surplus" countries, see Westbrook, Theory,
supra note 37, at 465 n.26.
225. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 293 (1989).
Professor LoPucki advanced our concept greatly in his ground-breaking article, Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors Bargain, SO VA. L. REV. 1887 {1994). Professors
Bebchuk and Fried have refined that concept considerably with their insight about adjusting
and nonadjusting creditors, although I agree with Professor LoPucki that all creditors are on
a spectrum from almost-fully-adjusting to completely involuntary and therefore non
adjusting. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71.

